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In its first century and a half, the Supreme Court never used the term “feder-
alism” in its opinions. The Court had talked about federal-state relations before, but 
the concept had gone unlabeled. That changed in 1939. Something new was hap-
pening, thanks in large part to Justice Felix Frankfurter. Just a month after joining 
the Court, Frankfurter authored the Court’s first opinion using the term “federal-
ism.” Frankfurter introduced federalism as a key concept for analyzing the relation-
ship between state courts and federal courts. Before long, Frankfurter would rely on 
federalism to fashion an original and enduring doctrine of judicial federalism: ab-
stention, which requires federal courts to sometimes refrain from hearing cases that 
are within their jurisdiction. 
This Article provides a historical study of Frankfurter’s contribution to the 
modern law of judicial federalism. It documents Frankfurter’s theory of federalism 
in his judicial opinions with a focus on the abstention cases. It also shows how the 
abstention cases and their concept of federalism were rooted in Frankfurter’s Pro-
gressive politics. They were a reaction to what he perceived as the federal courts’ 
anti-regulatory and anti-labor attitudes. 
The history—relevant today as the political discussion around the courts again 
echoes the Progressive Era—sets the stage for considering the future of abstention. I 
suggest three possibilities. The first, an originalist future, would more or less main-
tain the contemporary Supreme Court’s status quo on abstention, somewhat more 
modest than what Frankfurter envisioned: a cautious use of abstention in a rela-
tively small number of equitable cases. A second possibility would be a liberal future 
that backtracks from abstention, as legal liberals recognize a cautionary lesson in 
Frankfurter’s hostility to an assertive, rights-protecting judiciary. The third future 
would be one embracing Frankfurter’s vision of abstention in the name of judicial 
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restraint. Abstention has the potential to curb federal court power and, at least on 
the margins, put more adjudicative power in state courts. This possibility might 
bring together modern progressives, who are wary about a largely conservative fed-
eral judiciary, with conservatives who want to promote judicial restraint and an 
increase in democratic accountability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court did not use the term “federalism” in any 
opinions in its first 150 years.1 The Court had (of course) previ-
ously talked about federal-state relations, but it did so without 
the term “federalism”—it preferred a different vocabulary, dis-
cussing the police powers of the states and the enumerated pow-
ers of the federal government.2 The concept of federalism went 
unlabeled.3 It was not until 1939 that the term “federalism” came 
into regular use on the Supreme Court. Federalism arrived at the 
Court as a free-floating principle of constitutional theory, not ex-
plicitly tethered to any particular textual basis in the Constitu-
tion. For the ambitious justice who introduced the term, it would 
provide the basis for a subtle but significant rollback of federal 
court authority. That ambitious justice was Felix Frankfurter. 
His innovation fundamentally shaped the relationship between 
federal and state courts. Particularly through his invention of the 
federal court abstention doctrine, Justice Frankfurter made fed-
eralism a central consideration in assessing whether a particular 
case should be in state court instead of federal court.4 How and 
why Frankfurter brought federalism to the Supreme Court’s case 
law is an untold chapter in federalism’s legal, political, and intel-
lectual history. It is situated squarely in the Progressive Era de-
bates about the role of the federal courts in the American consti-
tutional system. It is a history that can also help us to see more 
clearly the challenges and possibilities for abstention’s future. 
 
 1 The word “federalism” appears only once in the US Reports prior to 1939 and then 
in an oral argument rather than an opinion of the Supreme Court. See Smith v Turner, 48 
US 283, 340 (1849). 
 2 See generally, for example, Ex parte Royall, 117 US 241 (1886) (discussing state-
federal relationships in the context of habeas corpus proceedings). 
 3 The term “federalism” was of course not Frankfurter’s creation. It could be found 
in prior cases and legal literature. See notes 31–38 and accompanying text. The term, 
however, had very rarely been used in any judicial opinions prior to Frankfurter’s use of 
the term on the Supreme Court. 
 4 Frankfurter introduced the terminology of federalism in a series of cases involving 
federal court review of state taxing power. The first of those cases focused on the authority 
of a federal court to enjoin state court proceedings, so the first use of the term “federalism” 
in the Supreme Court was a reference to judicial federalism. See Hale v Bimco Trading, Inc, 
306 US 375, 377–78 (1939). See also notes 42–47 and accompanying text. Frankfurter re-
ferred to federalism in several other tax cases before he used the conceptual apparatus in-
troduced in those cases to innovate in the field of federal courts. See Texas v Florida, 306 US 
398, 428 (1939) (Frankfurter dissenting); Graves v New York, 306 US 466, 488 (1939) (Frank-
furter concurring); State Tax Commission of Utah v Aldrich, 316 US 174, 183–84 (1942) 
(Frankfurter concurring). See also O’Malley v Woodrough, 307 US 277, 294–95 n 15 (1939) 
(Butler dissenting) (quoting Frankfurter’s concurrence in Graves on federalism). 
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Frankfurter invoked federalism to justify creating the first 
abstention doctrine in Railroad Commission of Texas v Pullman 
Co. 5 In that case, the Court held that federal courts must decline 
to decide cases that depend on an unsettled issue of state law, the 
resolution of which might remove the necessity of deciding a con-
stitutional issue.6 Since Frankfurter introduced “Pullman ab-
stention,” abstention doctrines have multiplied. Federal courts 
apply several related abstention doctrines to refuse to hear cer-
tain cases that can be heard by state courts.7 The federal absten-
tion doctrines have been controversial. A number of scholars have 
questioned whether it is appropriate for federal courts to refuse 
to decide a case that is clearly within their jurisdiction.8 In re-
sponse, a leading defense of abstention argues that abstention 
doctrines are based on longstanding traditions of the judiciary’s 
discretionary control of its docket.9 
Federalism, though, was not among the reasons offered to 
justify judicial discretion to decline hearing cases prior to Frank-
furter’s confirmation to the Supreme Court. By offering a history 
of Frankfurter’s interest in federalism-based abstention, this Ar-
ticle highlights the historical contingency of the doctrine. That 
doesn’t discredit the doctrine—just about every conceivable legal 
rule has some element of historical contingency in the circum-
stances of its creation. But it does show that the federalism justi-
fication for abstention doesn’t have the historical pedigree some 
have used to defend abstention. 
This historical point has doctrinal implications for absten-
tion’s scope. The more federalism is treated as a freestanding le-
gal value that might justify abstention,10 the more likely it is that 
abstention should apply across the board—to cases at law and eq-
uity—when states have strong interests in deciding a given 
 
 5 312 US 496 (1941). 
 6 See id at 498–500. 
 7 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction §§ 12–14 at 829–938 (Wolters 
Kluwer 7th ed 2016) (describing the abstention doctrines). 
 8 See generally, for example, Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, 
and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L J 71 (1984). 
 9 See generally, for example, David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 NYU 
L Rev 543 (1985). 
 10 See, for example, Courthouse News Service v Brown, 908 F3d 1063, 1071 (7th 
Cir 2018) (stating that “general principles of federalism [ ] underlie all of the abstention 
doctrines”). 
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case.11 But if federalism is just to be folded into the equity calculus 
as another factor when a court already has some measure of dis-
cretion, then the current Supreme Court’s tendency to limit ab-
stention strictly to actions seeking “equitable or discretionary re-
lief” makes sense.12 Still, commentators have noted that, despite 
strong language in some of its opinions, the Supreme Court has not 
yet directly held that abstention could never be used in actions at 
law.13 For his part, Frankfurter preferred the broader version of 
abstention. Contra the Supreme Court’s emphasis in more recent 
years, Frankfurter denied that abstention was merely a product of 
equity and claimed it had an independent basis in federalism.14 
Judicial federalism—the management of the relationship be-
tween federal and state courts—is not usually at the top of any-
one’s list of politically charged legal issues. Abstention certainly 
is not. But Frankfurter’s innovations in this field were a means 
to his very political goal: reducing the power of the federal courts. 
Federalism was the malleable, ostensibly neutral concept that 
provided Frankfurter with a rationale to pursue this long-term 
goal. 
Federalism’s political flexibility and unpredictability is a key 
theme that emerges from the history. At various times in Ameri-
can history, federalism has taken on partisan political valences. 
When the Rehnquist Court cut back on federal power,15 observers 
described it as a conservative “federalism revolution”—tied to 
both the conservative politics and the historically based 
 
 11 See Louisiana Power & Light Co v City of Thibodaux, 360 US 25, 27–28 (1959) 
(applying the abstention doctrine to an eminent domain proceeding that was not a tradi-
tional equitable proceeding because eminent domain is a “sovereign prerogative” of the 
state). 
 12 See Quackenbush v Allstate Insurance Co, 517 US 706, 730 (1996). 
 13 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. 
Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1107–08 (Foun-
dation 7th ed 2015). 
 14 Thibodaux, 360 US at 28. 
 15 See, for example, United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy concur-
ring) (joining the majority in striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and 
noting that “[t]his case requires us to consider our place in the design of the Government 
and to appreciate the significance of federalism in the whole structure of the Constitu-
tion”); United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 627 (2000) (striking down the Violence 
Against Women Act as beyond federal power and suggesting that “under our federal sys-
tem” any remedy for such violence must be provided by state, not federal, authorities). See 
also Morrison, 529 US at 654 (Souter dissenting) (criticizing the majority as ironically 
requiring the states to “enjoy the new federalism whether they want it or not”). These 
cases were sometimes referred to as the “New Federalism.” See, for example, Rosalie Ber-
ger Levinson, Will the New Federalism Be the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court?, 40 Valp U 
L Rev 589, 590 (2006). 
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originalist legal theories of that Court’s majority.16 But recent 
scholarship has reminded us that federalism has no single politi-
cal orientation.17 Federalism may have served conservative ends 
in some historical episodes, but it served progressive ends in oth-
ers.18 Contemporary proponents of progressive federalism19 argue 
that federalism should once again be used to further progressive 
causes.20 To illustrate, today, liberal Democratic state attorneys 
general are putting progressive federalism into action as they lit-
igate against conservative policies promulgated by a Republican 
administration in the national government.21 The history 
 
 16 See generally, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 
NM L Rev 7 (2001). See also Mark Tushnet, A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court and 
the Future of Constitutional Law 67–70, 249–78, 338–39 (Norton 2005); Richard H. Fallon 
Jr, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U Chi L 
Rev 429, 446–52 (2002) (arguing that legal conservatism is a family of philosophies rather 
than a single position, and suggesting that federalism may have stronger links with some 
versions of conservatism and weaker links with others); Linda Greenhouse, 2,691 Deci-
sions (NY Times, July 13, 2008), archived at https://perma.cc/U2TG-2L65; Linda Green-
house, States Are Given New Legal Shield by Supreme Court (NY Times, June 24, 1999), 
archived at https://perma.cc/9DHG-UBV8 (discussing how the Court sharply curbed fed-
eral power in three then-recent cases). 
 17 See, for example, Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 
124 Harv L Rev 4, 44–74 (2010). See also generally Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solu-
tions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law (Oxford 2018). 
 18 With a more recent wave of scholarship associated with the idea of “Progressive 
Federalism,” Professor Heather K. Gerken has suggested that the federalism in these 
cases could be thought of as “Federalism 2.0” while the Progressive Federalism scholar-
ship represents “Federalism 3.0.” See generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 
Cal L Rev 1695 (2017). In another essay, she called it the “new ‘new federalism.’” Heather 
K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 Yale L J 1889, 1889 
(2014) (emphasis in original). 
 19 When historians refer to the period known as the “Progressive Era,” they generally 
mean the era of social reform and activism from the late nineteenth century to the early 
twentieth century. (The exact contours of the period are endlessly debated among histori-
ans.) See generally Heather Cox Richardson, Reconstructing the Gilded Age and Progres-
sive Era, in Christopher McKnight Nichols and Nancy C. Unger, eds, A Companion to the 
Gilded Age and Progressive Era 7 (Wiley 2017) (reviewing historiographical debates on 
periodizing the Progressive Era). In more contemporary legal and political discourse, the 
term is back in vogue. As I suggest below, there is good reason to see links between the 
modern progressive concerns about the courts and the historical Progressive Era and its 
priorities. See notes 269–70 and accompanying text. In order to provide some clarity, I 
capitalize “Progressive” when I use it to refer to the historical era, while I use “progressive” 
without capitalization to refer to more contemporary political movements. 
 20 See generally, for example, Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 
Democracy J 37 (Spring 2012); Heather K. Gerken and Joshua Revesz, Progressive Feder-
alism: A User’s Guide, 44 Democracy J 39 (Spring 2017); Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or 
Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3 Harv L & Pol Rev 33 (2009). 
 21 See Elbert Lin, States Suing the Federal Government: Protecting Liberty or Playing 
Politics?, 52 U Richmond L Rev 633, 641–46 (2018) (describing recent litigation against 
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recounted in this Article provides a historical illustration of the 
progressive federalism of the Progressive Era itself, showing that 
Frankfurter used federalism to try to hold back the conservative 
federal courts. Federalism itself was not viewed as partisan, po-
litical language—and that, it seems, is part of the appeal of using 
the vocabulary of federalism to pursue political objectives. 
The history recounted in this Article demonstrates that pro-
gressive federalism has deep roots. It also directs the focus to an 
issue that has mostly been left out of recent progressive federal-
ism scholarship. In that literature, there has been plenty of dis-
cussion of the relationship between federal and state legislative, 
executive, and regulatory powers. This Article instead empha-
sizes judicial federalism—that is, the relationship between fed-
eral and state courts. A close look at the politics of judicial feder-
alism is timely. Since the summer of 2018 and the contentious 
arguments following the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
there have been renewed calls by a new generation of liberals and 
progressives to restrain the federal courts.22 The national political 
conversation around the courts today once again echoes the con-
cerns raised in the Progressive Era. Abstention deserves to be 
part of the discussion—not only as an option, but as a reminder 
 
the Trump administration initiated by state attorneys general); Philip Green, Comment, 
Keeping Them Honest: How State Attorneys General Use Multistate Litigation to Exert 
Meaningful Oversight over Administrative Agencies in the Trump Era, 71 Admin L Rev 
251, 258–64 (2019) (describing recent litigation against the Trump administration in the 
context of executive agencies in particular). See also Margaret H. Lemos and Ernest A. 
Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97 Tex L Rev 43, 65–85 
(2018) (describing the rise of attorney general–led public-law litigation from the late twen-
tieth century into the era of the Trump presidency). Another historical example illustrat-
ing the changing political valences is the use of federalism in two very different civil rights 
contexts. In the mid-twentieth century, southern segregationists tried to use principles of 
federalism to impede federal civil rights enforcement. But in the 1840s, principles of fed-
eralism allowed states to argue for more extensive citizenship protections for Black Amer-
icans. See Maeve Glass, Citizens of the State, 85 U Chi L Rev 865, 871, 919–33 (2018). 
 22 See, for example, Gregg Re, Liberal Profs Launch Campaign to Pack Supreme 
Court After Kavanaugh Confirmation (Fox News, Oct 16, 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/AP2P-UAAZ; Daniel Hemel and Christopher Jon Sprigman, Should Pro-
gressives Wage War on the Supreme Court? (Slate, Oct 11, 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/CA6P-B8UB; Dylan Matthews, Court-Packing, Democrats’ Nuclear Op-
tion for the Supreme Court, Explained (Vox, Oct 5, 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/Y9HG-B3S9; Ian Ayres and John Fabian Witt, Democrats Need a Plan B 
for the Supreme Court. Here’s One Option. (Wash Post, July 27, 2018), online at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/democrats-need-a-plan-b-for-the-supreme 
-court-heres-one-option/2018/07/27/4c77fd4e-91a6-11e8-b769-e3fff17f0689_story.html 
(visited May 21, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable); Michael Hiltzik, How a New Court-
Packing Scheme Could Save the Supreme Court from Right-Wing Domination (LA Times, 
July 2, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4UVZ-U9AC. 
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that the Progressive opposition to the courts had (and likely will 
have again) consequences that might be discomfiting to today’s 
progressives and liberals.23 The story of Frankfurter’s abstention 
can, among other things, remind modern observers that princi-
ples like federalism can have an element of unpredictability even 
when wielded strategically for political gains. Progressive politi-
cians discussed something very much like abstention as early as 
the 1910s, and Frankfurter took note. But by the time Frankfur-
ter made it part of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the labor 
issues that had originally motivated its introduction were (essen-
tially) gone and the doctrine’s first application thwarted civil 
rights litigation instead. 
After considering the history of Frankfurter’s federalism as 
well as its role in introducing the vocabulary of federalism and 
creating abstention doctrines, this Article presents three possible 
futures for federalism-based abstention doctrine. One possible fu-
ture is to maintain the Supreme Court’s current status quo, which 
emphasizes the division between actions at law and equitable ac-
tions. The current state of affairs is more informed by originalist 
(or at least historical) considerations than was Frankfurter’s most 
expansive vision of abstention: if one believes that legitimate con-
stitutional interpretation requires ascertaining the meaning of 
the Constitution at the time of its adoption, Frankfurter’s origi-
nality in crafting abstention doctrine is a liability. The discretion-
ary traditions of equity may provide a historical basis for absten-
tion, but federalism does not. The upshot of this analysis is to 
support the Supreme Court’s tendency in the Rehnquist and Rob-
erts eras to apply abstention in equitable actions but not in ac-
tions at law.24 
A second future would involve a drastic cutback of abstention 
doctrine. This might be thought of as a “legal liberal” future. Ab-
stention, as Frankfurter designed it, is in tension with the liberal 
minority-rights-protecting vision for the courts. Abstention was 
designed by a Progressive in order to allow federal courts to avoid 
deciding issues of federal law, which should be troubling to legal 
liberals who look to federal courts to preserve minority rights. 
 
 23 For a discussion of the racial politics of the Pullman decision, see text accompany-
ing notes 249–54. 
 24 For an example from the Rehnquist court, see Quackenbush, 517 US at 716–31. 
For an example from the Roberts court, see Sprint Communications, Inc v Jacobs, 571 US 
69, 77 (2013). 
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A third future would embrace the fullness of Frankfurter’s 
vision for abstention. For either a modern progressive or for a “ju-
dicial restraint” conservative interested in reducing the power of 
the federal courts, Frankfurter’s vision might be inspiring. At 
least on the margins, abstention promises to curb federal court 
power and put more adjudicative power in state courts. 
This Article is structured as follows. Part I describes Frank-
furter’s introduction of federalism on the Court. Part II describes 
the Progressive Era conflicts surrounding the federal courts that 
formed the backdrop for Frankfurter’s thinking. Part III explores 
Frankfurter’s analysis of federalism and the role of the federal 
courts in light of his Progressive commitments. It documents how 
abstention specifically emerged from the Progressive Era efforts 
to limit federal court power and instead to empower state courts. 
Part IV uses this history to consider the three possible futures 
mentioned above for abstention. 
I.  FELIX FRANKFURTER AND THE INVENTION OF FEDERALISM 
Prior to 1939, the Supreme Court never used the term “fed-
eralism.” The Court had dealt with classic issues of federal power 
throughout its history—such as the supremacy of federal law over 
state law25 and the scope of various enumerated powers in the 
federal constitution.26 But “federalism” was a term used by schol-
ars, not judges. Scholars were the ones who had the occasion to 
describe, at a high level of generality, the concept of a government 
involving multiple locations of authority. This could describe the 
national and state governments in the American system,27 or sim-
ilar arrangements in any number of other countries.28 Sometimes 
the term was also used to refer to a political attitude, in which case 
 
 25 See, for example, McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 326–27 (1819). 
 26 See, for example, Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 194–222 (1824) (addressing 
the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause). 
 27 See, for example, Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Background of American Federalism, 
12 Am Polit Sci Rev 215, 235–37 (1918); John Bassett Moore, Four Phases of American De-
velopment: Federalism—Democracy—Imperialism—Expansion 9–46 (Johns Hopkins 1912). 
 28 See generally, for example, Herman G. James, Federalism in Latin America, 55 
Bull Pan Am Union 229 (1922); Charles Grove Haines, Judicial Interpretation of the Con-
stitution Act of the Commonwealth of Australia, 30 Harv L Rev 595 (1917). 
1746 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1737 
 
it could refer generally to an attitude of centralizing,29 and some-
times to the Federalist political party at the nation’s founding.30 
The term had rarely been used in any judicial opinions prior 
to Justice Frankfurter’s use of the term on the Supreme Court in 
1939. Database searches of all state and federal cases for “feder-
alism” reveal only twelve references in any reported cases decided 
before 1939.31 The references to the term were often trivial. One 
of these uses was in the US Reports in an oral argument.32 Two 
more were in oral argument in state courts.33 Two were in early 
nineteenth-century libel cases in which allegedly defamatory 
newspaper publications mentioned “federalism” in discussions of 
state politics.34 Two were citations to historical works that used 
the term in their titles—one was about the United States and one 
about Australia.35 One was a reference to a French legal theorist 
as a “leading French writer on Federalism.”36 One was a reference 
to England, not the United States.37 Only in three cases did the 
 
 29 See, for example, Judson Harmon on Jefferson’s Ideas: Urges Democrats to Return 
to Old Principles, NY Times 5 (Mar 5, 1901); Congressman Williams Criticises Democrats, 
NY Times 5 (Oct 7, 1902). 
 30 The Federalists: Their System of Government the Subject of the Second Volume of 
“The American Nation.”, NY Times BR62 (Feb 3, 1906). 
 31 I ran searches in the databases Westlaw and Lexis Advance for all state and fed-
eral cases decided prior to 1939. I compared the results, which were almost but not per-
fectly identical. Lexis also returned Ex parte Royall, 117 US 241 (1886), but I have omitted 
it from the count because the term “federalism” appears only in a notation added by Lexis. 
 32 See Smith v Turner, 48 US 283, 340 (1849). 
 33 See Commonwealth v Blanding, 20 Mass 304, 308 (1825) (reprinting a reference 
from oral argument to an article entitled “Monarchy of Federalism”); State v Hunt, 20 SCL 
(2 Hill) 1, 43–44 (SC App 1834) (reprinting the characterization at oral argument of the 
election of Thomas Jefferson as a “contest [ ] between federalism, or national rights and 
liberal construction on the one side, and democracy, or State rights and strict construction 
on the other”). 
 34 In one of the cases, the term seemed to be used as one of opprobrium. See Beardsley 
v Maynard, 4 Wend 336, 346 (NY Sup 1830) (reprinting one of the allegedly libelous news-
paper publications that used the term “federalism” in discussing state politics). In the 
other case, the term was used positively. See United States v Haswell, 26 F Cases 218, 218 
(CC D Vt 1800). 
 35 See Bosworth v Harp, 157 SW 1084, 1085 (Ky App 1913) (citing Henry Adams’s 
book, New England Federalism, in a discussion of secession); Committee for Industrial 
Organization v Hague, 25 F Supp 127, 137 (D NJ 1938) (suggesting that the constitutional 
protection of free speech is a product of “that fear of the central government which is both 
the reason for and the handicap of Federations” and citing several histories of other fed-
erated states, including Failure of Federalism in Australia). 
 36 United States v Flegenheimer, 14 F Supp 584, 585–86 (D NJ 1935) (arguing for adop-
tion of a uniform interstate law and citing Louis Le Fur’s Etat Federal et Confederation 
d’Etats for the general proposition “that the field for uniformity widens with civilization”). 
 37 See Winkler v Scudder, 1 Ga 108, 128 (1846) (using the term “federalism” to de-
scribe the nationalization of England’s commerce: “She was then throwing off the re-
straints of Federalism, and multiplying the industrial pursuits of her people”). 
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term appear in an opinion with anything like a substantive refer-
ence to the American federal-state relationship.38 With this as the 
background in jurisprudence, it is all the more striking how sud-
denly and dramatically Frankfurter introduced the term into the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 
Federalism appeared repeatedly in Frankfurter’s judicial 
opinions in a variety of settings. It appeared in Supreme Court 
opinions almost immediately after Frankfurter joined the Court 
in 1939 as he began to articulate some of his views on federalism 
in a diverse range of cases.39 This Part will introduce Frankfur-
ter’s initial statements of his views in his 1939 opinions, before 
turning to focus on two areas of particular importance to him: the 
power to issue injunctions and abstention doctrine. 
A. 1939: Frankfurter and Federalism Join the Court 
Frankfurter made four references to federalism in his judicial 
opinions in his first year on the Court. Giving a concept a name is 
a significant development. The label may not change the con-
cept,40 but a change in labeling is a clue to the historian that 
something new is going on.41 
The first time the word “federalism” appeared in a Supreme 
Court opinion was Frankfurter’s opinion in Hale v Bimco 
 
 38 See W.B. Surviving Partner v Latimer, 4 US Appx (4 Dall Appx) i, vi (Del 1788) 
(referencing the “spirit of federalism” that motivated the 1776 Delaware constitution to 
“recogniz[e] the authority of ‘resolutions of congress,’ and . . . requir[e] ‘a judge of admi-
ralty’”); United States v Parker, 19 F Supp 450, 453–54 (D NJ 1937) (“This opinion is not 
the place to expound our hobby of comparative federalism. Suffice it to say that our Con-
stitution differs from that of most federations in failing to allocate the definition, at least, 
if not the administration of criminal law to the central government.”); Passett v Chase, 107 
S 689, 692 (Fla 1926): 
[t]he development of the law on [habeas corpus] has been a part of the prodigious 
contest which has been waged in the past history of this Union between the pro-
ponents of nationalism and localism, of federalism and states’ rights, of the lib-
eral constructionists, and the strict constructionists, of the federal Constitution, 
and between those great centripetal and centrifugal forces involved in our admi-
rable but somewhat complex system of government. 
 39 On Frankfurter’s appointment, see Noah Feldman, Scorpions: The Battles and Tri-
umphs of FDR’s Great Supreme Court Justices 152–63 (Twelve 2010). 
 40 Though it might—terminology used to “frame” a concept can shape observers’ percep-
tions of that concept. See Donald J. Kochan, The [̶T̶a̶k̶i̶n̶g̶s̶] Keepings Clause: An Analysis of 
Framing Effects from Labeling Constitutional Rights, 45 Fla St U L Rev 1021, 1081–93 (2018). 
 41 On the importance of concepts and terminology in intellectual history, see gener-
ally Peter de Bolla, The Architecture of Concepts: The Historical Formation of Human 
Rights (Fordham 2013). 
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Trading, Inc. 42 The opinion was released on February 27, 1939, 
barely a month after Frankfurter had joined the Court.43 The case 
concerned a Florida statute that required the State Road Depart-
ment to inspect imported cement and collect an inspection fee. In 
a Florida state court proceeding, a petitioner sought a writ of 
mandamus to compel Hale, a member of Florida’s State Road De-
partment, to enforce the statute.44 The Supreme Court of Florida 
issued the writ of mandamus. Meanwhile, Bimco Trading filed 
suit in federal district court, arguing that the Florida statute was 
unconstitutional and seeking an injunction against enforcement 
of the statute.45 The federal court issued the injunction and the 
Florida Supreme Court stayed the mandamus pending Supreme 
Court review. The first issue centered on the Anti-Injunction 
Act.46 Frankfurter said it was inapplicable in the present case, 
precisely because the federal court never in fact enjoined the state 
court. Frankfurter concluded his discussion of the Anti-Injunction 
Act with a brief comment on its function: “That provision is an 
historical mechanism . . . for achieving harmony in one phase of 
our complicated federalism by avoiding needless friction between 
two systems of courts having potential jurisdiction over the same 
subject-matter.”47 That was all; Frankfurter then went on to ad-
dress the merits of the statute’s validity. But that reference to 
“our . . . federalism” would be back. 
A few weeks later, Frankfurter again used the phrase “our 
federalism” to describe the jurisdiction of the Court over contro-
versies between two states.48 The phrase appeared again in a tax 
case49 in which the Supreme Court refused to find immunity from 
state tax for a federal employee.50 Frankfurter concurred, arguing 
that it was essential not to expand intergovernmental immunities 
 
 42 306 US 375 (1939). See also Michael G. Collins, Whose Federalism?, 9 Const Commen 
75, 75 (1992). 
 43 He was nominated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on January 5, 1939, con-
firmed by the Senate on January 17, 1939, and commissioned on January 20, 1939. Fed-
eral Judicial Center, Felix Frankfurter, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, archived 
at https://perma.cc/GZG5-QPFF. 
 44 Hale, 306 US at 376–77. 
 45 Id at 377. 
 46 The Anti-Injunction Act effective at the time was the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch 231, 
§ 265, 36 Stat 1162 (1911). 
 47 Hale, 306 US at 378. 
 48 Texas v Florida, 306 US 398, 428 (1939) (Frankfurter dissenting) (“The authority 
which the Constitution has committed to this Court over ‘Controversies between two or 
more States,’ serves important ends in the working of our federalism.”). 
 49 Graves v New York, 306 US 466, 490 (1939) (Frankfurter concurring). 
 50 Id at 487 (majority). 
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from taxation in such a manner as to undercut the authority of 
either state or federal government. “[T]he fact that we are a fed-
eralism [sic],” Frankfurter wrote, “raises problems regarding 
these vital powers of taxation. Since two governments have au-
thority within the same territory, neither through its power to tax 
can be allowed to cripple the operations of the other.”51 In previ-
ous cases, Frankfurter suggested, the Court had been insuffi-
ciently sensitive to this concern: “A succession of decisions 
thereby withdrew from the taxing power of the States and Nation 
a very considerable range of wealth without regard to the actual 
workings of our federalism, and this, too, when the financial 
needs of all governments began steadily to mount.”52 In the inter-
vening years, “two other great English federalisms,” Australia 
and Canada, considered and rejected intergovernmental tax im-
munity.53 Frankfurter’s phrasing sounds odd to modern ears, un-
accustomed to hearing the American state referred to as “a feder-
alism.” This in itself is a striking reminder that federalism was 
not a widely used term at the time, and its usage was less fixed 
than it would be by the end of the twentieth century. (Frankfurter 
may have made federalism a common term in modern constitu-
tional law, but he did not succeed in popularizing all of his own 
usages.) 
In the fall of 1939, Frankfurter was again talking about fed-
eralism. The case was Palmer v Massachusetts, 54 and it foreshad-
owed Frankfurter’s later opinions on abstention. In Palmer, a 
railroad had filed for reorganization under the federal bankruptcy 
laws. The railroad’s bankruptcy trustees had applied to the Mas-
sachusetts Department of Public Utilities for permission to aban-
don eighty-eight passenger stations.55 The Department conducted 
a series of hearings on the issue. While the proceedings were still 
ongoing, Palmer, a creditor of the railroad, argued in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings for an order directing the Trustees to abandon 
the stations. Massachusetts argued that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction, but the district judge disagreed and issued a decision 
on the merits, granting “the very relief for which the Trustees had 
applied to the Department and which was still in process of 
 
 51 Id at 488 (Frankfurter concurring). 
 52 Id at 490 (citation omitted). 
 53 Graves, 306 US at 490 (Frankfurter concurring). 
 54 308 US 79 (1939). 
 55 Id at 82. 
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orderly consideration.”56 The Court granted certiorari because, in 
the words of Frankfurter’s majority opinion, the case raised “im-
portant questions” about the application of the railroad bank-
ruptcy law, “particularly where it intersects the regulatory sys-
tems of the states.”57 As Frankfurter formulated the issue, “[t]he 
District Court assumed power to supplant the relevant authority 
of the state—an authority which . . . has not been conferred by 
Congress either upon the federal courts or the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.”58 He made it clear from the outset that “our 
federalism” was central to the case. “[W]ariness,” he said, is nec-
essary when “the problem of construction implicates one of the 
recurring phases of our federalism and involves striking a balance 
between national and state authority in one of the most sensitive 
areas of government.”59 
Frankfurter argued that the Court should be wary about 
finding congressional interference with state regulation. Con-
gress had chosen to regulate “purely intrastate activities of an in-
terstate carrier” when necessary to effectuate interstate regula-
tion.60 But this was the exception rather than the rule, and 
federalism was the reason why: “[S]uch absorption of state au-
thority is a delicate exercise of legislative policy in achieving a 
wise accommodation between the needs of central control and the 
lively maintenance of local institutions.”61 The opinion then con-
sidered and rejected the claim that the bankruptcy code provided 
the district court with equal authority in the context of bank-
rupted railroads as in other contexts.62 
Thus, from the very start of Frankfurter’s career on the Su-
preme Court, he established federalism as an important analyti-
cal consideration in a number of doctrinal areas. He also made 
several points about federalism clear in his opinions. First, feder-
alism was a shared American value (“our federalism,” in Hale and 
Palmer). Second, federalism required a careful “balance between 
national and state authority.”63 Finally, federalism valued inde-
pendent state action, whether of state courts (Hale), state taxing 
 
 56 Id at 83. 
 57 Id at 82. 
 58 Palmer, 308 US at 82. 
 59 Id at 83–84. 
 60 Id at 84. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Palmer, 308 US at 87–89. 
 63 Id at 84. 
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entities (Graves v New York64), or state regulators (Palmer). 
Whereas the Framers used the term “federalism” to refer to a ro-
bust national government,65 Frankfurter’s conception of federal-
ism emphasized the continued vitality of the states. In other 
words, for an eighteenth-century American, the novel point in fed-
eralism was the active role of the national government. Federal-
ism continued to have connotations of centralization at the ex-
pense of the states into the twentieth century.66 By contrast, for 
Frankfurter, federalism was to be invoked to preserve and protect 
the states from being supplanted by national action. 
B. Limiting Injunctions 
Frankfurter’s first major innovation in the field of judicial 
federalism was to limit the power of federal courts to enjoin state 
courts. The Anti-Injunction Act had long limited the federal 
courts’ power in this area, prohibiting the issuance of injunctions 
by a federal court against proceedings in a state court.67 But there 
had always been a few exceptions to the scope of coverage of the 
Anti-Injunction Act, some built into the Act itself and others rec-
ognized by the courts. In Toucey v New York Life Insurance Co,68 
the Court heard a case about the limits of the so-called “relitiga-
tion exception” to the anti-injunction rule. The case turned on 
whether federal courts could enjoin state court litigation of mat-
ters that had previously been decided by a federal judgment.69 
Writing for the Court, Frankfurter said that the relitigation ex-
ception did not exist, again grounding the rationale in federalism. 
 
 64 306 US 466 (1939). 
 65 See, for example, Jonathan Elliot, ed, The Debates in the Several State Conven-
tions, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Con-
vention at Philadelphia, in 1787 155 (Washington 2d ed 1836) (quoting a speech by Patrick 
Henry). See also Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 Harv J L & Pub Pol 19, 
19 (1982) (noting that “[w]hen Alexander Hamilton exalted [federalism’s] virtues, he 
meant it as a criticism of colonial disunity”). 
 66 See, for example, Judiciary Rapped by a Chief Justice, NY Times 11 (Nov 24, 1907) 
(quoting the Dean of Yale Law School’s statement that “[w]e are threatened with a revival 
of Federalism and with a Federalism which is more extreme and radical than the leaders 
of the old Federal Party ever countenanced or would have tolerated” due to the rise of 
centralization). 
 67 See George A. Martinez, The Anti-Injunction Act: Fending Off the New Attack on 
the Relitigation Exception, 72 Neb L Rev 643, 645 (1993) (noting that “for almost two hun-
dred years, this country has had some form of Anti-Injunction Act”). 
 68 314 US 118 (1941). 
 69 See id at 126. See also James E. Pfander, Principles of Federal Jurisdiction § 9.3.3 
at 283 (West 2d ed 2011). 
1752 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1737 
 
The Anti-Injunction Act, according to Frankfurter, “is not an 
isolated instance of withholding from the federal courts equity 
powers possessed by Anglo-American courts.”70 Instead, he said, 
it is part of the “delicate adjustments required by our federalism,” 
pursuant to which “Congress has rigorously controlled the ‘infe-
rior courts’ in their relation to the courts of the states.”71 Frank-
furter embarked on a detailed examination of the legislative his-
tory of the 1793 act in which the Anti-Injunction Act originated.72 
Frankfurter admitted that the purpose of the Act was really not 
federalism per se: “Much more probable is the suggestion that the 
provision reflected the prevailing prejudices against equity juris-
diction.”73 That didn’t stop him from viewing it as a component of 
federalism.74 
Frankfurter managed to get six votes on the Court for his opin-
ion reducing the scope of the exceptions for the Anti-Injunction Act, 
all in the name of “our federalism.” But Justice Stanley Reed, in 
a dissent joined by Chief Justice Harlan Stone and Justice Owen 
Roberts, complained that Frankfurter had disregarded or dis-
carded decades of precedent: “We think it may be accurately 
stated that for more than half a century there has been a widely 
accepted rule supporting the power of federal courts to prevent 
relitigation. There are adequate precedents directly in point and 
others which recognize that the rule exists and is sound.”75 
The decision in Toucey surprised commentators, who viewed 
it as upsetting substantial law that (they had thought) was set-
tled.76 Congress too was surprised, and a few years later, in 1948, 
explicitly rejected Toucey’s result, adding the words “to protect or 
effectuate its judgments” to the exceptions to the Act.77 As the re-
viser’s note explained, “[T]he revised section restores the basic 
law as generally understood . . . prior to the Toucy [sic] deci-
sion.”78 And that is where matters stand today: “[F]ederal courts 
 
 70 Toucey, 314 US at 141. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id at 130–32. For an alternative approach to the Anti-Injunction Act, see generally 
James E. Pfander and Nassim Nazemi, The Anti-Injunction Act and the Problem of Federal-
State Jurisdictional Overlap, 92 Tex L Rev 1 (2013). 
 73 Toucey, 314 US at 131. 
 74 Id at 141. 
 75 Id at 152–53 (Reed dissenting). 
 76 See Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Federalism”, 
27 Ga L Rev 697, 709 (1993). 
 77 Revision of Title 28, United States Code, HR Rep No 308, 80th Cong, 1st Sess, 
A182 (1947). 
 78 Id. 
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can enforce the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion by enjoin-
ing proceedings in state court that would run afoul of those doc-
trines.”79 Frankfurter thus failed to significantly cut back the law 
of injunctions through judicial interpretation, but it was not for 
lack of trying. 
C. Abstention Doctrine 
Much more durable was Frankfurter’s opinion in Pullman. 
Pullman established the principle that federal courts should ab-
stain from deciding a constitutional issue when the case involved 
an unsettled issue of state law, the resolution of which could re-
move the necessity of deciding the constitutional issue. The case 
involved a requirement by the Texas Railroad Commission that 
all railroads with Pullman (sleeper) cars employ a white conduc-
tor. There was a statutory argument that the Commission lacked 
authority to make this requirement and a constitutional argu-
ment that the regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause.80 
Frankfurter thought it inappropriate for the federal court to 
decide a constitutional issue when construction of a state statute 
could resolve the issue in such a manner so as to avoid the consti-
tutional question. And the meaning of the state statute was a 
matter for the state courts, not the federal courts: “The last word 
on the meaning of Article 6445 of the Texas Civil Statutes, and 
therefore the last word on the statutory authority of the Railroad 
Commission in this case, belongs neither to us nor to the district 
court but to the [S]upreme [C]ourt of Texas.”81 
Frankfurter recognized that he was dealing with judicial eq-
uity powers, but he integrated federalism into the equity calculus: 
“Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of 
a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with 
 
 79 Pfander, Principles of Federal Jurisdiction § 9.3.3 at 283 (cited in note 69). See 
also Chick Kam Choo v Exxon Corp, 486 US 140, 146–48 (1988) (discussing the application 
of the relitigation exception); Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co v Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers, 398 US 281, 287 (1970). For a discussion of the evolution of the courts of ap-
peals’ treatment of the relitigation exception after 1948, see Andrea R. Lucas, Note, Bal-
ancing Comity with the Protection of Preclusion: The Scope of the Relitigation Exception to 
the Anti-Injunction Act, 97 Va L Rev 1475, 1497–1501 (2011) (describing the cases coming 
after the revisions but before the Supreme Court had addressed the scope of the exception 
post-Toucey); id at 1483–90 (describing the current circuit split since Chick Kam Choo). 
For criticism of Justice Reed’s dissent (and of Congress’s action in restoring the pre-Toucey 
status quo) as inconsistent with “traditional notions of judicial federalism,” see Martin H. 
Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U Chi L Rev 717, 722–26 (1977). 
 80 Pullman, 312 US at 498. 
 81 Id at 499–500. 
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state policies.”82 Frankfurter synthesized a long line of prior cases 
about equity power into this federalism rubric. “These cases re-
flect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system 
whereby the federal courts, ‘exercising a wise discretion,’ restrain 
their authority because of ‘scrupulous regard for the rightful in-
dependence of the state governments’ and for the smooth working 
of the federal judiciary.”83 Accordingly, the rule in the Pullman 
case was presented as the employment of the federal courts’ equi-
table powers “in furthering the harmonious relation between 
state and federal authority without the need of rigorous congres-
sional restriction of those powers.”84 
Frankfurter would later double down on the federalism ra-
tionale. In Louisiana Power & Light Co v City of Thibodaux,85 he 
recognized that Pullman and subsequent abstention cases had 
been equity cases. But he insisted that the abstention principle 
was not merely “a technical rule of equity procedure.”86 The ab-
stention cases, he said, “reflect a deeper policy derived from our 
federalism.”87 Accordingly, he was willing to apply the abstention 
principle to an eminent domain proceeding that he recognized 
was not a traditional equitable proceeding.88 The City of 
Thibodaux had initiated expropriation proceedings against an 
out-of-state corporation’s property and the corporation had re-
moved the case to federal court.89 It was appropriate, Frankfurter 
wrote for the majority, for the federal court to stay proceedings to 
allow the state supreme court to construe the relevant expropria-
tion statute.90 Eminent domain was a “sovereign prerogative,” 
Frankfurter noted, and it was accordingly respectful of the sover-
eignty of the states in the federal system to allow them to construe 
their statutes first.91 
Pullman abstention remains good law to this day. After its 
introduction, other abstention doctrines have also multiplied and 
“our federalism” became a central organizing principle of the 
 
 82 Id at 500. 
 83 Id at 501, quoting Cavanaugh v Looney, 248 US 453, 457 (1919), and Di Giovanni 
v Camden Insurance Association, 296 US 64, 73 (1935). 
 84 Pullman, 312 US at 501. 
 85 360 US 25 (1959). 
 86 Id at 28. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Thibodaux, 360 US at 25. 
 90 Id at 30–31. 
 91 Id at 28. 
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Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on federal jurisdiction, particu-
larly as it came into contact with state court proceedings.92 Per-
haps most famously, Justice Hugo Black invoked “our federalism” 
in Younger v Harris,93 which established the principle that federal 
courts should abstain from enjoining an ongoing state criminal 
proceeding.94 
II.  THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
Justice Frankfurter’s thoughts about federalism developed 
before he came to the Court. As a young lawyer coming of age in 
the Progressive Era, he began his career by engaging in a debate 
over the place of the courts in the American system of government 
that would shape the rest of his career. But the link between 
Frankfurter’s early politics and scholarship, on the one hand, and 
his theory of federalism, on the other, has received little notice in 
the substantial scholarly literature. The only major work to date 
that has seriously studied Frankfurter’s views on federalism—an 
insightful article by Professor Mary Brigid McManamon—em-
phasized Frankfurter’s interest in reducing a crowded docket on 
the Supreme Court.95 This was certainly a relevant, and im-
portant, consideration, which this Article will also describe briefly 
in this Part. But it wasn’t the only consideration that Frankfurter 
had in mind when he thought about the federal courts. The his-
torical evidence suggests that his involvement with the politically 
charged fights over federal courts in the 1910s and 1920s were, if 
anything, even more important in shaping Frankfurter’s 
worldview.96 This point is surprisingly almost entirely absent 
 
 92 See generally Ann Woolhandler, Between the Acts: Federal Court Abstention in the 
1940s and ’50s, 59 NY L Sch L Rev 211 (2015). 
 93 401 US 37 (1971). 
 94 Id at 41, 44. The extent to which the principle of abstention is mandatory or dis-
cretionary is debatable, in light of the Court’s restatement of the Younger rule in Sprint 
Communications, Inc v Jacobs, 571 US 69, 72 (2013) (“When there is a parallel, pending 
state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecu-
tion.”). 
 95 See McManamon, 27 Ga L Rev at 733–37 (cited in note 76). An additional recent 
article, much more limited in scope, provided a very specific appreciation of Frankfurter’s 
coedited casebook on federal courts. See generally Evan Tsen Lee, Federal Jurisdiction 
According to Professor Frankfurter, 53 SLU L J 779 (2009). Though that article lacks a 
broader historical frame, it accords with the points I make in this Article about Frankfur-
ter’s commitment to federalism being quite developed before he joined the Court. 
 96 Scholars already know that Frankfurter’s experience in this era shaped his later 
thoughts on judicial restraint, civil liberties, and civil rights. See, for example, Melvin I. 
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from the otherwise enormous literatures on Frankfurter, on fed-
eralism, and on the federal courts.97 The point is a crucial one for 
understanding Frankfurter’s jurisprudence generally, and his 
thinking about federalism and his invention of abstention in par-
ticular. This Part introduces the Progressive politics surrounding 
the courts that informed Frankfurter’s thinking. 
A. The Political Fight over the Federal Courts in the 
Progressive Era 
Frankfurter entered the legal profession in the Progressive 
Era, when the legitimacy of the federal courts was hotly con-
tested. The judicial history of the first few decades of the twenti-
eth century has become known as the “Lochner era.” The idea that 
the courts were generally conservative and hostile to state regu-
lation was something of a Progressive morality tale. Recent schol-
arship has shown that federal courts were not as hard-headed in 
opposing Progressive regulation as the Progressives made them 
out to be (and correspondingly, that Progressive reform legisla-
tion was not as benign as it was often presented to be).98 That 
said, the concern that the judiciary was a threat to Progressivism 
generally was widespread. 
The “Lochner era” label encompassed several doctrinal 
trends. The first was a demanding constitutional scrutiny of state 
regulatory law. This was the principle embodied in the Lochner v 
New York99 opinion itself: that the Constitution protected freedom 
of contract as part of the “liberty” safeguarded by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that this rendered in-
valid state regulations on the market.100 In Lochner, the Court 
 
Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter: Judicial Restraint and Individual Liberties 1–33 (Twayne 
1991); Michael E. Parrish, Felix Frankfurter and His Times: The Reform Years 39–219 
(Free Press 1982). The impact of Frankfurter’s early political observations on his later 
thinking about the federal courts is, however, lacking. 
 97 Edward A. Purcell Jr is the only historian to note this link, which he did in a re-
view essay that started with Frankfurter and then spent most of its analysis on recent 
histories of the federal judiciary. See Edward A. Purcell Jr, Reconsidering the Frankfur-
terian Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 L & Soc Inquiry 679, 
681–88 (1999). 
 98 See generally, for example, Ken I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties: Disconti-
nuities in the Development of American Constitutional Law (Cambridge 2004). See also 
David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against Pro-
gressive Reform 40–55 (Chicago 2011). 
 99 198 US 45 (1905). 
 100 Id at 53, 64. 
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struck down a state maximum hours law.101 In his dissent in Loch-
ner, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr famously accused the Court 
of establishing laissez-faire economics as constitutional law.102 
A second issue—distinct from the decision of Lochner but 
equally characteristic of the era, and equally formative of public 
attitudes toward the courts—was the use of the labor injunc-
tion.103 The injunction rose to prominence in the 1880s as a potent 
tool to restrain labor.104 Continuing on through the 1920s, labor 
injunctions remained one of the most visible interventions of the 
courts into political hot-button issues around labor, strikes, and 
industrial regulations. Some 28 injunctions were issued against 
labor in the 1880s.105 In 1895, the Supreme Court approved an 
anti-labor injunction under the Sherman Act,106 opening the flood-
gates: 122 injunctions were issued in the 1890s after this decision, 
and 328 were issued between 1900 and 1909.107 As one commen-
tator explained, a simple temporary injunction was all that was 
needed “because strikes are usually won or lost within a few 
days.”108 
Legislatures responded to the rise of the injunction, and the 
courts answered. In the process, the courts became still more 
deeply entangled in the debate about their relationship to the 
state democratic process. As Frankfurter and his coauthor Na-
than Greene summarized the history, Americans were widely 
troubled by the “expansion of a simple, judicial device to an en-
veloping code of prohibited conduct, absorbing, en masse, execu-
tive and police functions and affecting the livelihood and even 
lives of multitudes.”109 The historian William E. Forbath ex-
plained that “industrial ‘disorder’ and workers’ massive yet articu-
late defiance of judge-made law gradually persuaded state and na-
tional lawmakers and political elites that the old legal order was 
untenable and that labor’s exiled constitutional claims demanded 
 
 101 Id at 64–65. 
 102 Id at 74–76 (Holmes dissenting). 
 103 See Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 NYU L Rev 462, 
482–90 (2017). 
 104 See William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 
59–66 (Harvard 1991). 
 105 Jon R. Kerian, Injunctions in Labor Disputes: The History of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, 37 ND L Rev 49, 49 (1961). 
 106 In re Debs, 158 US 564, 599–600 (1895). 
 107 Kerian, 37 ND L Rev at 49–50 (cited in note 105). 
 108 Id at 51. 
 109 Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, Labor Injunctions and Federal Legislation, 
42 Harv L Rev 766, 767 (1929). 
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recognition.”110 Progressive politicians in the nation’s political elite 
increasingly shared labor’s worries about big business, judicial 
overreach in the name of property, and an erosion of the First, 
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.111 
Labor-backed anti-injunction bills began appearing at state 
and national levels as early as the 1890s. But state laws that were 
favorable to labor—limiting injunctions, outlawing contracts that 
prohibited joining a union, and the like—were frequently struck 
down by the courts, or at least gutted by narrow construction.112 
Most famously, in 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act,113 
which was supposed to rein in the use of the labor injunction by 
establishing rigorous requirements for the issuance of an injunc-
tion.114 But the Supreme Court in 1921 narrowly construed the 
Clayton Act as merely a restatement of the prior law, removing 
the teeth from the law.115 
In the 1920s, Congress considered a series of proposals to 
limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts and to limit injunction 
power.116 In 1928, Senator George Norris introduced a federal anti-
injunction bill and began to hold hearings on the use of the injunc-
tion. These hearings demonstrated how far labor’s anti-injunction 
analysis had spread. The anti-injunction law was finally passed 
in 1932 as the Norris-LaGuardia Act117 (drafted in part by Felix 
Frankfurter).118 Ultimately the Wagner Act119 would provide more 
 
 110 Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement at 9 (cited in 
note 104). 
 111 See Norris, 92 NYU L Rev at 492–94 (cited in note 103); Forbath, Law and the 
Shaping of the American Labor Movement at 128–66 (cited in note 104). 
 112 Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement at 128–66 (cited 
in note 103). 
 113 38 Stat 730 (1914). 
 114 See Stanley I. Kutler, Labor, the Clayton Act, and the Supreme Court, 3 Labor Hist 
19, 19–20 (1962); Norris, 92 NYU L Rev at 490–92 (cited in note 111). 
 115 See Duplex Printing Press Co v Deering, 254 US 443, 469 (1921). 
 116 See Edward A. Purcell Jr, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the 
Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America 85–
91 (Yale 2000). 
 117 47 Stat 70 (1932), codified at 29 USC § 101 et seq. 
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robust protection for labor to associate and engage in collective 
action.120 
B. Federal Versus State 
Both of these politically contentious lines of cases in the Loch-
ner era (the substantive due process cases and the injunction 
cases) focused attention on the federal courts. But they weren’t 
exclusively the domain of the federal courts. Indeed, in terms of 
the number of cases decided, the state courts were by far the great-
est offenders. When Forbath catalogued cases striking down labor 
legislation during the nineteenth century, the majority of those 
cases turned out to be state cases.121F121 A study by the US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics in 1922 listed some three hundred cases where 
courts struck down labor-related statutes as unconstitutional 
during the first two decades of the twentieth century.122 The re-
port noted, “In all but a very few instances the decisions here 
noted have been those of courts of last resort of the State in which 
the law was enacted or of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”123 
In short, the state courts were as much a part of the problem 
as the federal courts. Indeed, in terms of sheer number of cases 
decided, the state courts were a greater problem than federal 
courts. This creates something of a puzzle if we seek to under-
stand Frankfurter’s scholarly focus on the federal courts. Why did 
he ignore the state courts? Two factors are worth considering: the 
relative priority of state versus federal law and the relative ease 
of bringing political accountability to bear on the state courts ver-
sus the federal courts. 
1. The relative priority of state versus federal law. 
While state courts did much of the work in striking down leg-
islation and issuing injunctions, much of the law that they applied 
 
 120 See Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement at 164–65 
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was federal. The constitutional cases predominantly cited the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution. In terms of au-
thoritative interpretation of the federal constitution, the US Su-
preme Court had the last word. Although state courts had simi-
larly applied substantive due process to strike down legislation, 
the law at issue was federal. The Lochner decision itself, for in-
stance, became the authoritative precedent once it was decided. 
And it is worth noting that at the time, the Supreme Court’s ju-
risdiction to review state court decisions was asymmetric: the 
Court only had jurisdiction to review those cases where the fed-
eral right was denied, but not where the federal right was vindi-
cated. In other words, if a state high court struck down a state 
law as a violation of the federal Constitution, US Supreme Court 
review was unavailable. So, many federal question cases in the 
lower courts were never going to end up in the Supreme Court, 
and labor advocates and Progressive reformers alike felt as 
though the federal courts had a one-way ratchet in favor of the 
laissez-faire constitutionalism of federal law.124 
The predominance of federal law reinforced the dominance of 
the federal courts, and of the Supreme Court in particular, at the 
top of the judicial hierarchy.125 The state courts, when left to their 
own devices, varied in the extent to which they enforced a strict 
freedom-of-contract jurisprudence.126 There were high profile 
cases in which state courts struck down state regulations, but this 
was by no means the universal practice of state courts.127 
As for the injunctive cases, here too both state and federal 
courts were implicated, but the greatest focus was on the federal 
courts. As one scholar put it: 
While the agitation against what was called “Government by 
Injunction” was to a certain extent independent of the 
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agitation for the exemption of labor from the operation of the 
anti-trust laws, and embraced not only the federal but also 
the state courts, the injunction cases which aroused the 
greatest resentment were either directly or indirectly con-
nected with the Sherman Act.128 
Again, this centered the attention on the federal courts, and 
not the state courts. As Frankfurter and Greene wrote, “The main 
considerations which underlie both national and state legislative 
proposals for regulating the use of the injunction in labor contro-
versies are the same. But the federal aspects of the labor injunc-
tion are the more important.”129 This also informed Frankfurter’s 
early interest in federalism as a general concept. He believed that 
the expanding regulatory power of the federal government, which 
began in the late nineteenth century with the Interstate Com-
merce Act130 and the Sherman Act,131 had made the relationship 
of state and national government a crucial issue for the courts.132 
2. The availability of political means for reining in the 
state courts. 
Progressives found federal courts to be the more difficult 
problem because state courts proved more susceptible to political 
pressure. The most obvious point is that a great many state 
judges were elected and were thus sensitive to political pressure. 
Progressives and other partisans of labor could then use straight-
forward political channels to put a fear of the people into state 
court judges.133 
Beyond political pressure, there were even more direct means 
of using politics to express discontent with judicial decisions. A 
wide variety of proposals were debated in state constitutional con-
ventions during the Progressive Era. They included proposals to 
abolish judicial review, to require unanimous or supermajority 
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votes of judges to strike down legislative enactments, and to recall 
judges or judicial decisions.134 
The Progressive proposal that most riled the conservative le-
gal establishment was the recall of judges. A high-profile conflict 
about this issue occurred when Arizona sought admission to the 
union in 1910. Arizona’s draft constitution included a broad recall 
provision that covered judges. But this provision, promoted by 
Progressive Democrats and labor leaders, received pushback from 
conservative Republicans. When Congress considered the ena-
bling act to grant statehood to Arizona and New Mexico, the issue 
of the recall provision prompted debate and, ultimately, a veto 
from President William Howard Taft. President Taft argued that 
the judicial branch was valuable precisely because it was not 
bound to majoritarian democracy but was instead charged with 
upholding legal principles regardless of their popularity.135 But by 
1912, seven states had adopted the recall of judges, to the chagrin 
of conservative lawyers.136 
Another alternative was to allow the recall of judicial deci-
sions. President Theodore Roosevelt was an outspoken proponent 
of this measure (even though he thought that recalling judges was 
a step too far).137 He viewed this as part and parcel of the in-
creased use of the referendum in state politics—another popular 
Progressive project. Not only should referenda be employed as a 
direct method of creating laws, he said, but he also argued that 
the people should be able to recall judicial decisions by referen-
dum:138 “[W]hen a judge decides a constitutional question, when 
he decides what the people as a whole can or cannot do, the people 
should have the right to recall that decision if they think it 
wrong.”139 During the course of his quixotic third-party campaign 
for president on the Progressive Party ticket, Roosevelt would 
again advocate for the recall of judicial decisions: “We stand for 
an upright judiciary. But where the judges claim the right to 
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make laws by finally interpreting them, by finally deciding 
whether or not we have the power to make them, we claim the 
right ourselves to exercise that power.”140 
In sum, then, the Progressives believed that they had a fairly 
extensive repertoire of resources to employ against state court 
activism. They were not always successful, of course. But the sit-
uation in the states nonetheless could sensibly appear to them to 
be considerably different from the situation in the federal courts. 
III.  THE POLITICS OF ABSTENTION:  
FRANKFURTER’S VISION OF FEDERALISM 
Justice Frankfurter was a Progressive. His understanding of 
federalism generally, and his abstention jurisprudence in partic-
ular, was deeply informed by the political controversies of the Pro-
gressive Era, as I describe in Part III.A. While Frankfurter’s 
scholarly writings on the federal courts often put technocratic 
analysis of caseloads and judicial administration in the forefront, 
as Part III.B sketches, he had his eye on the political implications 
of his judicial reform ideas at the same time. Most strikingly, the 
contours of Pullman abstention were lifted almost directly from a 
Progressive Era legislative effort to limit federal court jurisdic-
tion, as I document in Part III.C. This Part concludes by reflecting 
on why Frankfurter’s Progressive vision for federalism and ab-
stention gained traction even after the concerns of the Progres-
sive Era were replaced by a new set of priorities in what can be 
called an era of “legal liberalism.” 
A. Frankfurter and the Progressive Position 
Lochner and the labor injunction cases provided the backdrop 
against which Frankfurter developed his views of the federal 
courts. Telling, perhaps, was his choice of heroes in this period. 
Frankfurter’s political hero at the beginning of his career was 
President Theodore Roosevelt.141 After graduating from law 
school, Frankfurter worked briefly in private practice before go-
ing into government (and taking a pay cut), working for Henry 
Stimson, who had been handpicked by President Roosevelt to be 
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the US Attorney for the Southern District of New York.142 There, 
Frankfurter cut his teeth as a lawyer in an active office that inves-
tigated and prosecuted everything from small-scale fraudsters tar-
geting immigrants to large-scale revenue fraud by major corpora-
tions.143 When Stimson was appointed secretary of war by 
President Taft, Frankfurter went with his mentor to Washington 
and was given a post in the Bureau of Insular Affairs.144 Frank-
furter thought about leaving his job to campaign for former Pres-
ident Roosevelt’s third-party run in 1912.145 In that campaign, 
Roosevelt made the courts a campaign issue, harshly criticizing 
courts that put economic interests over “human rights.”146 
Through his early work for the president’s appointees, Frank-
furter was surrounded by individuals who were deeply concerned 
with the relationship between Progressive reform and the courts. 
He shared that concern, and in the years to come it continued to 
be one of his major interests. Frankfurter was as invested in ex-
panding the space for Progressive legislation as anyone. In 1922, 
Frankfurter defended a minimum wage law in the case of Adkins 
v Children’s Hospital,147 losing in the Supreme Court.148 
Frankfurter shared the basic Progressive concerns about the 
courts during this period. In a 1916 article, Frankfurter said that 
there were two major issues presented to the Supreme Court 
since the 1890s. The first was the scope of congressional regula-
tory power under the Commerce Clause (later to become essential 
to the New Deal’s expansion of federal power).149 The second was 
the extent to which state regulatory power was limited by judicial 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment (the Lochner line of 
cases): 
There was thus presented to the Court in greater volume and 
with unparalleled intensity, the determination of the powers 
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of the Nation and of the State, and a delimitation of the field 
between them—questions whose decision probably touched 
the public at once more widely and more immediately than 
any issues at any previous stage of the Court’s history.150 
Frankfurter’s other hero during this time was Justice 
Holmes. Frankfurter consciously worked to promote Holmes’s 
reputation as a critic of federal court overreach.151 Frankfurter 
was fond of quoting Holmes’s characterization of the Lochner pe-
riod: “When twenty years ago a vague terror went over the earth 
and the word socialism began to be heard, I thought and still 
think that fear was translated into doctrines that had no proper 
place in the Constitution or the common law.”152 Frankfurter saw 
Holmes’s dissent in the Lochner case as a turning point in terms 
of articulating the rightful place of courts as deferential to state 
regulation.153 
As Frankfurter observed the anti-labor decisions of the Su-
preme Court into the 1920s, he continued to voice a Progressive 
critique. In a series of magazine articles and editorials published 
in the 1920s, Frankfurter repeatedly endorsed Holmes’s deferen-
tial approach to the democratic process.154 Frankfurter rejected 
Progressive proposals to amend the Constitution to repeal the 
Due Process Clause or protect child labor. Instead, as historian 
Brad Snyder has noted, “Frankfurter preferred Holmes’s demo-
cratic solution that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be in-
voked ‘beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the 
making of social experiments.’” 155 
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Frankfurter’s basic belief about the federal courts was that 
they were in the habit of overreaching. Frankfurter thoroughly 
internalized this standard Progressive position, and indeed by the 
1920s, helped to shape it. His own spin on the position was dis-
tinctive. Unlike some Progressives, Frankfurter identified with 
the federal judiciary such that he was still anxious to preserve the 
prestige and autonomy of the federal courts—even as he sought 
to rein in what he saw as abuses. This concern with protecting 
the interests of the federal courts could be seen in the way that 
Frankfurter often coupled the Progressive critique of the courts 
with another theme that motivated conservatives as well: reduc-
ing the workload of the federal courts in order to improve judicial 
quality. 
B. Frankfurter and the Burden on the Federal Courts 
The caseload of the federal courts grew enormously from the 
1870s into the twentieth century. In his influential book, The 
Business of the Supreme Court, Frankfurter and his former stu-
dent, Professor James M. Landis, chronicled one aspect of this 
story in detail: the dramatically expanding caseload of the Su-
preme Court. A recurring theme of the book was that the Court 
was subject to human constraints. Supreme Court justices would 
turn out subpar work when overtaxed with the heavy burdens of 
riding circuit (in the early days of the Court) or of excessive case-
loads (in the later era of the Court). This principle, that an over-
worked court is less effective, resonated with such conservative 
jurists as then-Chief William Howard Taft156 as well as with Pro-
gressives. But for Progressives, the reduction of Supreme Court 
caseload nicely dovetailed with the objective of reducing federal 
court interference with regulation. 
Frankfurter put both of these interests together in his writ-
ten works in the 1920s. In his explanation of the political discus-
sions about the modification of federal jurisdiction, one can catch 
glimpses of the basic considerations that would motivate some of 
Frankfurter’s later federalism jurisprudence: 
The continuous effort of twenty years to enable the federal 
courts to cope with mounting litigation by reforming their 
cumbersome and wasteful organization was paralleled by an 
equally vigorous movement to enable them to do their work 
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by reducing the range of their business. For twenty years the 
Congressional Record registers this attempt to limit jurisdic-
tion. The more moderate proposal was to increase the pecu-
niary amount necessary for resort to the federal courts. The 
more far-reaching remedy was the old attempt to remit liti-
gation affecting foreign corporations to the state courts.157 
The theme was repeated in another article a year later, in which 
Frankfurter observed (favorably) that there had been repeated 
calls for “a reexamination of the present scope of federal litiga-
tion,” with the goal of “shutting off at its sources business that 
eventually reaches the Supreme Court.”158 One of the key aspects 
of this effort was the reduction of federal jurisdiction in favor of 
state jurisdiction: “This involves relinquishing of federal concern 
over conduct more appropriately left to state action as well as 
providing for trial in state courts of cases now exclusively en-
trusted to United States courts.”159 It was a theme he would re-
turn to again,160 one of obvious importance to the development of 
abstention. 
In most of his scholarly work, Frankfurter emphasized his 
technical expertise and downplayed his political commitments. 
His account of the jurisdiction-modification plans underplays the 
Progressive political overlay that provided much of the excite-
ment—and controversy—behind the congressional proposals.161 
For the many efforts to modify the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts in the first decades of the twentieth century there were two 
primary motivations, and Frankfurter sometimes emphasized 
one or the other. Some proposals were simply an effort to cope 
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with mounting litigation. But others were motivated more di-
rectly as responses to the substance of the federal courts’ most 
politically charged decisions. Frankfurter of course recognized 
this. 
To take just one example, Frankfurter was troubled by the 
fact that asymmetric review of state court decisions by the Su-
preme Court led to geographical disparity in the application of 
substantive federal (constitutional) law. Especially important on 
this topic were a series of cases about worker’s compensation. In 
1911, the Supreme Court indicated that worker’s compensation 
laws would pass scrutiny under the Due Process Clause.162 But 
then New York’s high court played the anti-regulatory role. Its 
1911 decision invalidating the first American worker’s compensa-
tion law163 attracted considerable national attention.164 But the 
Supreme Court could not review the decision because the New 
York court had “vindicated” a federal right, and under the statute 
governing Supreme Court review of state court decisions, such 
vindication was unreviewable. The Washington Supreme Court 
later affirmed the constitutional validity of similar workers’ com-
pensation legislation.165 As Frankfurter and Landis explained, 
there was “a wide-spread feeling that, in practice, constitutional-
ity turned on geography.”166 Supreme Court review could ensure 
that the Constitution was at least interpreted uniformly across 
the nation. But simply expanding the federal appellate power was 
not a satisfactory solution, for that would simply increase the bur-
dens on the federal courts. Certiorari jurisdiction for the Supreme 
Court was a solution proposed by conservative members of the 
bench and bar.167 Congress passed expanded certiorari in 1916, 
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and it remarkably did so without debate and without any serious 
opposition, as Frankfurter noted with satisfaction.168 
While the move toward greater certiorari jurisdiction helped, 
the concern about federal caseloads continued into the 1920s. 
What Frankfurter seems to have learned from his careful study 
of the ongoing debates about federal courts was that Progressives 
and conservatives shared a concern that the federal courts, and 
perhaps especially the Supreme Court, were doing too much. The 
Progressives were more concerned about the substance of federal 
law standing as an obstacle to regulatory experimentation; legal 
conservatives were more concerned about the burden on the 
courts.169 Frankfurter himself believed that the federal courts 
were an important institution, and so he shared both concerns.170 
To put it differently, while the Progressive position was political, 
the concern about overburdened dockets was a position that had 
bipartisan appeal. 
C. Application of the Lessons of the Progressive Era: The 
Legislative Origins of Abstention 
Frankfurter’s interest in the legislative efforts to rein in fed-
eral court jurisdiction provided him with more than a background 
for his own thought about federalism and the courts. In at least 
one case, it provided Frankfurter with a concrete approach to 
keeping cases in the state courts—an approach which he im-
ported directly into his abstention jurisprudence. 
In 1910, the House of Representatives considered an amend-
ment to a bill that would have restricted the federal courts’ in-
junctive power. Under the proposed amendment, the district 
courts would have been prohibited from taking jurisdiction of 
suits “to suspend, enjoin, or restrain the action of any officer of a 
State in the enforcement, operation, or execution of a statute of 
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such State, upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such 
statute.”171 Frankfurter described this proposal in an article some 
sixteen years later.172 The language of the amendment is not ex-
actly pellucid. It seems to focus on federal injunctive power in the 
situation where that power is premised on the unconstitutionality 
of a state statute. To explain the purpose of the amendment, 
Frankfurter quoted Democratic Representative William A. Cullop 
of Indiana: 
The amendment does not destroy the constitutional right of 
any citizen to have an investigation of his cause in a Federal 
court. . . . This simply gives the State courts the right to con-
strue their own statutes before the Federal courts construe 
them in given cases, in order that the doctrine of the State 
court in the construction of a statute may be before the Fed-
eral court when it is called upon to review the statute.173 
The amendment was ultimately rejected, according to Frankfur-
ter, not on its merits but as a political strategy in order to keep 
the issue from distracting from the other reform items on the bill 
to which this amendment had been added.174 
In his written description, Frankfurter did not flag the 
charged political dynamics of this proposal. But the House debate 
makes it quite clear that of central concern to several represent-
atives was the interpretation of “police power” regulations—in 
other words, exactly the kind of matters that were central to the 
Lochner line of cases. “The purpose of his amendment is to have 
the State[ courts] construe their own statutes before they are con-
strued by the Federal courts, is it not? . . . Especially statutes 
which create police regulations . . . [s]uch as fixing fares, regula-
tion of charges, and so forth,” Representative Cullop asked in one 
debate.175 
Frankfurter may have had something like this in mind when 
he suggested in 1928 that the appropriate balance between fed-
eral and state courts would take into account specific kinds of 
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issues.176 Frankfurter argued that the distribution of responsibil-
ities among these different judicial systems was a matter of “prac-
tical sentiment,” of pragmatic evaluation.177 The details of the 
proper distribution would vary depending on the issue: “Some fed-
eral rights are readily adapted to enforcement by state tribunals; 
others are clearly meant for the federal courts. Some federal 
rights involve no lively local interests; others are heavily en-
meshed in conflicts between state and national authority.”178 
Whatever Frankfurter was thinking in 1928, Frankfurter’s 
opinion in Pullman put into effect Cullop’s proposal almost pre-
cisely. The holding of Pullman is that federal courts should ab-
stain when they are faced with an unsettled issue of state law, 
the resolution of which might remove the necessity of deciding the 
federal constitutional issue.179 Alternatively, it could be articu-
lated in Cullop’s words as “giv[ing] the State courts the right to 
construe their own statutes before the Federal courts construe 
them.”180 
The approach that Frankfurter would adopt in his abstention 
jurisprudence was essentially identical to the legislative proposal 
that Frankfurter himself wrote about in his study of the federal 
courts. This seems more than mere coincidence. It provides strong 
circumstantial evidence that Frankfurter’s later federalism juris-
prudence should be seen as a development of his observation of 
the federal courts’ politics in the first decades of the twentieth 
century. 
D. Putting Federalism in Context: A Preliminary Look at Why 
Frankfurter’s Vision of Federalism and Abstention 
Succeeded 
Federalism is not the only issue for which the Progressive 
Era informed Frankfurter’s jurisprudence. The most familiar and 
distinctive element of Frankfurter’s judicial philosophy, his com-
mitment to judicial restraint, stems from the same source. 
Part III.D.1 explains the parallels between Frankfurter’s commit-
ment to federalism and his commitment to judicial restraint. 
Frankfurter believed that one of the lessons of the Lochner era of 
jurisprudence was that courts should generally refrain from 
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striking down democratically enacted legislation. While the Loch-
ner-era courts generated controversy by striking down Progres-
sive regulatory laws, Frankfurter carried the principle into his 
jurisprudence on civil rights and civil liberties. Many of Frank-
furter’s colleagues on the Court rejected his philosophy of judicial 
restraint and seemed to be put off by Frankfurter’s tendency to 
craft his jurisprudence in the shadow of the Progressive Era. Jus-
tices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas in particular engaged 
in a long-running and sometimes acrimonious debate with Frank-
furter about this subject.181 
Strikingly, federalism was an area where Frankfurter was 
able to win over some of his fellow justices, as I describe in 
Part III.D.2. This raises another question: Why were Frankfur-
ter’s ideas about federalism successful while his views on judicial 
restraint were not? One might have thought that they would ei-
ther succeed or fail together, given that both are derived from 
Frankfurter’s view of the courts in the Progressive Era. 
Part III.D.3 suggests one part of the answer. Drawing on re-
cent cultural and intellectual history, it briefly describes what we 
can call the “New Deal federalism fad.” While full development of 
this point would require a book, this short Section serves as a re-
minder of federalism’s flexibility and relevance to different con-
stituencies for different reasons. Frankfurter’s federalism was 
motivated in large part by his formative experience in the Pro-
gressive Era. The New Deal federalism had its own flavor, an ef-
fort to integrate localism with the national development vision of 
the New Deal state. It was called at the time a “New Federal-
ism.”182 A full exploration of how Frankfurter’s vision of federal-
ism convinced his colleagues would require detailed studies of 
both jurisprudence and interpersonal relationships. But for now, 
it’s worth simply observing, as a starting point, that new ideas 
about federalism helped facilitate the rise of New Deal liberalism. 
Frankfurter’s vision of judicial restraint originated in the 
same experiences with Progressive judicial politics that informed 
his thoughts on federalism. Most of his colleagues abandoned 
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judicial restraint during the Warren Court years.183 But federal-
ism lived on. The practical relevance of federalism to the New 
Deal era helped to facilitate federalism’s transition from Progres-
sivism to liberalism.184 The simple fact is that Frankfurter’s fed-
eralism jurisprudence wasn’t quite as out of touch with his times 
as some of his other positions on the Supreme Court were. 
1. Learning the lessons of the Progressive Era and bringing 
them into the era of legal liberalism. 
From the evidence surveyed, one can put together the pieces 
for a possible way of understanding Frankfurter’s long-term vision 
of federalism in his jurisprudence.185 Frankfurter internalized the 
belief that the federal courts posed significant risks of harm if they 
interfered with democratically enacted legislation. Judicial re-
straint was a virtue. Still, it was not a value that could be easily 
protected by legislation—even if desirable subject-matter re-
strictions, like those in the Clayton Act, were readily subverted. 
But both conservatives and progressives could agree on trying to 
reduce the scope of federal judicial activity if the objective was 
articulated in a palatable and nonpartisan manner, such as when 
it was described as an effort to clear crowded dockets. 
In federalism, Frankfurter found an abstract principle that 
could support cutting back on federal court decisions. 
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Frankfurter’s tendency to invoke the general principle of federal-
ism was informed by his background belief that federal jurisdic-
tion has very little constitutional specificity. For example, in an 
article coauthored with then-student James M. Landis, he ex-
plained his belief that “the Constitution has prescribed very little 
in determining the content, and guiding the exercise, of judicial 
power.”186 This is not to suggest that Frankfurter was insincere 
in his commitment to federalism.187 But it is to suggest that, par-
ticularly in the abstention context, Frankfurter was strategic in 
his deployment of the concept. He used it to carve out a limit on 
the federal courts’ jurisdiction that legislators had tried and failed 
to provide during the Progressive Era. 
So far, this story parallels that told by other scholars about 
Frankfurter’s civil rights jurisprudence. Frankfurter’s appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court had been greeted with enthusiasm by 
liberals, who expected Frankfurter to emerge as a model liberal 
justice.188 As it turned out, however, Frankfurter did not support 
the rights-based jurisprudence that was becoming a hallmark of 
legal liberalism in the middle of the twentieth century. Instead, 
he stuck to the lessons he had learned in the Progressive Era and 
repeatedly urged his colleagues on the Court to give greater def-
erence to the democratic legislature.189 In this, Frankfurter dis-
appointed his earlier liberal supporters and clashed with many of 
his colleagues. Frankfurter was a relic of an earlier age, a Pro-
gressive who had failed to make the transition to liberalism.190 
Frankfurter’s vision of federalism (with abstention as a con-
crete application of this principle) was consistent with his Pro-
gressive commitments. But unlike his more directly stated views 
on deference to legislatures regarding the subject of civil rights, 
Frankfurter was able to convince his colleagues to sign on to the 
idea of judicial federalism. It was not an idea that the Court had 
articulated before. But it was an idea that survived the 
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Progressive-to-liberal transition in a way that judicial restraint 
generally did not. 
2. Frankfurter and Black on abstention. 
Justice Black’s reaction to Frankfurter’s Progressive ideas is 
a marker of the difference between the reception of Frankfurter’s 
notions of judicial restraint and federalism. Black became well-
known on the Court as an absolutist about the Bill of Rights: he 
was adamant about the judiciary’s responsibility to enforce the 
Bill of Rights as law without any qualification. He and Frankfur-
ter clashed repeatedly on this point and their interpersonal rela-
tionship was delicate and often acrimonious.191 Yet, despite the 
fact that Frankfurter’s federalism arguments for abstention mir-
rored the reasons for judicial restraint more generally, Black 
bought into the idea of abstention. He would ultimately go beyond 
Frankfurter in creating the most familiar abstention doctrine in 
Younger v Harris, using Frankfurter’s own phrase, “Our Federal-
ism”192—though without crediting Frankfurter.193 
Characteristically, once Black accepted the principle of feder-
alism in the abstention context, he was more systematic in apply-
ing it than Frankfurter. They divided over the issue early on in 
the 1943 decision Burford v Sun Oil Co. 194 Black, writing for the 
majority, built on Pullman to hold that the federal court should 
abstain from deciding a case when its decision would run the risk 
of disrupting a complex state regulatory scheme.195 Black claimed 
that this was an application of the principle in Pullman that a 
federal court exercising its equitable powers should do so in a 
manner that would “further[ ] the harmonious relation between 
state and federal authority.”196 The extension was facially a sen-
sible one, but Frankfurter would have none of it. 
From one angle, Frankfurter’s position in his Burford dissent 
was ironic. He would apply abstention principles to protect state 
adjudication in federal question cases, where one might have 
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thought that it would be most appropriate for federal courts to 
adjudicate state matters. But he would not apply abstention prin-
ciples to the diversity cases where state law controlled due to Erie 
Railroad Co v Tompkins. 197 
But, in fact, Frankfurter’s position made a great deal of 
sense. If the goal of abstention was, as I have argued, to reduce 
the opportunities for the federal courts to issue federal injunc-
tions and set constitutional precedents, then the federal question 
cases were the problem cases. Just five years before, Erie had es-
tablished that federal courts had to apply state substantive law 
in diversity cases.198 Justice Louis Brandeis in Erie had been pur-
suing the same Progressive objective as Frankfurter.199 So Frank-
furter would have no reason to think that abstention was needed 
to accomplish his objective in the diversity context. 
In his dissent in Burford, Frankfurter argued that it mat-
tered that the case was brought as a diversity action, and that in 
such a context the federal courts were directly charged with the 
task of deciding matters of state law.200 In other words, the con-
stitutional avoidance rationale that had figured so prominently 
in Pullman was missing, and Frankfurter thought that the Court 
should have relied upon that fact to distinguish Burford and re-
fuse to abstain. 
In any case, though, it was Black who created the most famil-
iar of the abstention doctrines, and he did so by relying on Frank-
furter’s federalism theory. In a majority opinion written by Black 
in Younger, the Supreme Court held that federal courts should 
abstain from exercising their jurisdiction when necessary to avoid 
interfering with ongoing state court criminal proceedings. Black 
wrote that the “sources of the policy are plain”201 and proceeded 
to offer two bases for the abstention principle. Frankfurter’s in-
fluence was immediately apparent. The first source of justifica-
tion for abstention was the historical tradition of the chancellor’s 
discretion in equity.202 The second and “even more vital consider-
ation” was “comity” or federalism: 
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[T]hat is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of 
the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of sep-
arate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that 
the National Government will fare best if the States and their 
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions 
in their separate ways.203 
Black then invoked the phrase that Frankfurter himself had first 
introduced to the Court: “This, perhaps for lack of a better and 
clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as ‘Our Federal-
ism.’” 204 The scope of Younger abstention, premised on “Our Fed-
eralism,” applies now not only to state criminal proceedings (cov-
ered by the original decision) but also to state enforcement actions 
from private suits (such as contempt proceedings)205 and enforce-
ment actions analogous to criminal proceedings (such as public 
nuisance cases).206 Black gave Frankfurter no credit, not even in-
cluding a citation to Pullman. But when it came to Black’s justi-
fication for abstention, Frankfurter had been there first. 
3. Why federalism succeeded where judicial restraint 
failed. 
An entire article could be written to flesh out the attitudes of 
the other justices toward federalism, and to explain why judges 
who did not agree with Frankfurter on judicial restraint as a gen-
eral matter might have found the federalism ideology persuasive. 
For present purposes, it will suffice to note three points about the 
transition from Progressivism to liberalism, a transition which 
many scholars associate with the New Deal.207 
First, federalism survived the New Deal period without much 
political controversy. The New Deal’s liberal political economy of 
a large and active federal government proved quite able to func-
tion in tandem with local and regional administrations. If the 
New Deal marked a new era of big government, in other words, it 
was one that came to rely on federal-state cooperation.208 (This is 
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at odds with the association of federalism with “small govern-
ment,” as was common in the Rehnquist era, for example.209) In 
contrast, the debate about judicial engagement and activism was 
at the center of national politics, thanks to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan.210 Frankfurter’s inclination was to 
defer to the executive on court-packing, a move that embittered 
his relationship with his mentor, Justice Brandeis, and arguably 
affected his relationships with colleagues when he joined the 
Court.211 That federalism did not enter into such a fraught politi-
cal and ideological fight was probably helpful. 
Second, a fad for localism meshed nicely with the vision of 
federalism that Frankfurter articulated. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
as Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen has noted, “[a] variety of pro-
ponents self-consciously embraced regionalism as an answer to 
looming ‘vaster and vaster federal bureaucracies’ and a ‘central-
izing state.’” 212 Many leading New Dealers sought to construct 
linkages with traditions of localism in order to provide cultural 
rootedness for their programs and avoid the accusation that their 
social programs were simply top-down impositions. One example 
of this kind of thinking in action was found in the Tennessee Val-
ley Authority (TVA) project, run by Frankfurter’s protégé David 
E. Lilienthal. Lilienthal had been a student of Frankfurter’s at 
Harvard and then obtained a job in the Roosevelt administration 
on Frankfurter’s recommendation.213 Lilienthal believed that the 
future of an advanced liberal society lay in combining centralized 
expertise with localized inputs and controls. It was this combina-
tion that he endeavored to put into action with the TVA, though 
the project in fact fell far short of his goals.214 
Lilienthal’s attempt at implementation may have been 
unique, but his sentiment was not. There was robust cultural 
movement for localism in America in the 1930s that carried for-
ward into the 1940s and beyond. Historian Daniel Immerwahr 
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has documented this tendency in academia, in government, and 
in popular culture.215 Bulman-Pozen has similarly documented 
widespread interest in regional units of American society, sug-
gesting that Americans sought to avoid the excessive homogeni-
zation of American culture and society in the face of a growing 
federal government.216 
Writing in 1938, Professor Jane Perry Clark identified a vast 
array of formal and improvised practices of cooperation and collab-
oration between national and state governments to effect policy ob-
jectives. She identified this as a “New Federalism.”217 Reviewing 
the book in the Harvard Law Review, Professor David Riesman ap-
plauded Clark for revealing the wide extent of national-state coop-
eration already in practice.218 He hoped that it might mark a path 
forward that would transcend the usual divisions between the 
“sloganeers” of “states’ rights” and “centralization.”219 Riesman 
opined that “[c]ooperative federalism finds support in our consti-
tutional tradition (as well as in our constitutional law).”220 He 
praised its practical potential for administering federal policies 
on a state level, and also its democratic virtue in giving space for 
“autonomic forces.”221 Riesman was a star student of Frankfur-
ter’s who had recently completed a clerkship (on Frankfurter’s 
recommendation) with Justice Brandeis,222 so Frankfurter cer-
tainly read the review. He too was evidently impressed with 
Clark’s work, and cited it in his opinion in Palmer.223 For our pur-
poses, the basic point is that Frankfurter’s invocation of judicial 
federalism was not a mere aberration, but gave judicial expres-
sion to a sentiment with considerable cultural currency. 
Third, Frankfurter’s judicial federalism deferred to state 
courts, unlike his more general deference to state legislatures in 
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civil rights cases. Whatever doubts the federal courts may have 
had about the state courts, it may have been easier for liberal 
judges to defer to a court than to a legislature. One of the lessons 
that legal liberals took from the court-packing fight was that the 
judiciary was an important check on politics.224 If one thought 
that the role of courts was (at least in part) to provide an inde-
pendent check on the political process,225 one kind of court (fed-
eral) could defer to another kind of court (state) without threat-
ening the fundamental role of courts in the system.226 But 
deference to legislatures could be seen as an abdication by the 
courts of their essential role. Frankfurter’s judicial federalism 
theory would have been at least more generally in accord with the 
principle of judicial competence so central to legal liberalism227 
than his broader deference to democratic legislatures. 
* * * 
Frankfurter’s federalism jurisprudence was deeply informed 
by the Progressive Era. But it was also in tune with an important 
line of thought in the New Deal era. This was doubtless helpful 
in gaining traction for Frankfurter’s federalism ideas. A detailed 
account of how justices like Black thought about federalism will 
have to await another paper. But for the moment, the New Deal 
context at least provides clues as to why Frankfurter’s federalism 
jurisprudence managed to persuade his colleagues in a way that 
his judicial restraint theory did not. 
Frankfurter’s career spanned a divide in the politics of fed-
eral courts. He grew up in the era of Progressivism. There were 
many divisions among Progressives, but Progressives generally 
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shared skepticism about courts interfering with legislative re-
forms. They tended to dislike rigid constitutional rights, distrust 
federal courts, and preferred for matters to be worked out through 
politics rather than through legal decision. 
Frankfurter finished his career in the era of legal liberal-
ism.228 Legal liberalism can be thought of as an approach to the 
courts that valorized and celebrated judicial protection of individ-
ual rights. In many ways, this orientation toward the federal 
courts could hardly have been more opposed to the Progressive 
Era distrust. 
IV.  THREE FUTURES FOR FEDERALISM-BASED ABSTENTION 
In Justice Frankfurter’s hands, federalism became a consti-
tutional value that provided the Supreme Court with a rationale 
to restrain the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The purpose for 
this doctrinal innovation was connected to a particular political 
perspective on the judiciary. A clear understanding of this history 
provides the first step for analysis of abstention’s merits.229 The 
context in which Frankfurter created federalism-based absten-
tion is different from our own; his motives may have differed from 
ours. There is always the risk of a genetic fallacy in criticizing a 
current doctrine based on the history of its creation. Still, the his-
tory of its creation can inform contemporary analysis. 
The history can provide a jumping-off point for at least three 
different futures for federalism-based abstention. Two of them 
are cautious or critical about abstention. The history of federal-
ism-based abstention should remind originalists that the doctrine 
is only loosely connected to the constitutional text, a problem con-
sidered in Part IV.A. An originalist future for abstention would 
basically maintain the Supreme Court’s current status quo, lim-
iting abstention’s application to equitable cases. The history 
should meanwhile remind legal liberals that abstention was de-
signed to provide federal courts an “out” when called upon to ad-
judicate issues of federal constitutional law (in tension with the 
rights-protecting theory of the federal courts held by many legal 
liberals). A legal-liberal future might cut back on abstention’s 
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application, analyzed in Part IV.B. But a third possible future for 
federalism-based abstention is to embrace a robust, Frankfur-
terian version of the doctrine as a means of curbing federal court 
power and, at least on the margins, putting more adjudicative 
power in state courts. This possibility might appeal to modern 
progressives who are wary about a largely conservative federal 
judiciary as well as to conservatives who want to promote judicial 
restraint, and it is considered in Part IV.C. 
A. The Textual Problem 
In the Constitution, the subject matter jurisdiction of federal 
courts overlaps with that of state courts. But there is no textual 
hook in the Constitution for the idea that federal courts should sit 
out a case in order to allow a state court to adjudicate an issue. 
The Tenth Amendment provides merely that the states retain 
powers not explicitly delegated to the federal government, which 
is nothing more than restating explicitly what is already implicit 
in the Constitution’s text and structure—the familiar theory that 
the Constitution contains enumerated powers.230 It’s possible that 
there is something more to the Tenth Amendment—that it con-
stitutes a substantive outer limit on federal power—but that idea 
is controversial.231 The Supreme Court does not endorse that po-
sition.232 The most straightforward reading of the Constitution is 
that federalism will come before the federal courts as a substan-
tive problem. For example, the federal courts have to decide, as a 
matter of substantive constitutional law, when the national gov-
ernment has—or lacks—the power to regulate a given subject.233 
 
 230 See US Const Amend X. For the classic statement of the enumerated powers the-
ory, see Federalist 45 (Madison), in The Federalist, 308, 313 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed) (“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Govern-
ment, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite.”). 
 231 See, for example, Charles Cooper, Reserved Powers of the States, in David F. Forte 
and Matthew Spalding, eds, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution 479, 479–83 (Heritage 
2d ed 2014). 
 232 Professor Calvin R. Massey has argued that the abstention cases must implicitly 
rest on the Constitution, possibly under a Tenth Amendment theory. See Calvin R. Mas-
sey, Abstention and the Constitutional Limits of the Judicial Power of the United States, 
1991 BYU L Rev 811, 821 (1991). If this is the case, it only sharpens the current point that 
the constitutional analysis is lacking. 
 233 See, for example, Gonzales v Raich, 545 US 1, 9 (2005) (holding that the Controlled 
Substances Act is within the Commerce Clause power and thus trumps permissive state 
marijuana law); United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 567–68 (1995) (finding that the Gun-
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But other than the Tenth Amendment, there isn’t really a consti-
tutional hook to hang a federalism theory on. In sum, the Consti-
tution provides pretty sparse grounds for abstention doctrines. 
In the absence of direct textual support, originalists of vari-
ous stripes will (sometimes) look to historical practice to inform 
their constitutional interpretation.234 This is where Frankfurter 
comes in—eventually. For most contemporary originalists, those 
who subscribe to the “original public meaning” approach,235 prac-
tices close in time to the adoption of the Constitution are of great-
est importance in that they might provide some evidence of the 
meaning of key terms in the document at the time of enactment.236 
(Some textualists might value historical practice less and prefer 
instead to simply look for historical evidence of the meaning of 
the words;237 original intent originalists—a small minority now—
might value historical practice more.238) When it comes to 
 
Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power). 
See also Bond v United States, 564 US 211, 222 (2011) (“By denying any one government 
complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of 
the individual from arbitrary power.”). 
 234 See, for example, Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U Chi L Rev 
269, 295 (2017); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U 
Ill L Rev 1935, 1978–80; Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretative Conventions, 70 U 
Chi L Rev 519, 525–29, 537–39, 548–50 (2003); John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and 
the Study of History, 26 Harv J L & Pub Pol 83, 87–88, 91–92 (2003). See generally William 
Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan L Rev 1 (2019); Jonathan Gienapp, Histori-
cism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 Fordham L Rev 935 (2015); Cur-
tis A. Bradley and Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and 
Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 S Ct Rev 1. See also NLRB v Noel Canning, 573 
US 513, 572 (2014) (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (“[W]here a governmental practice 
has been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic, the 
practice should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision.”). 
 235 See, for example, Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 
Fordham L Rev 375, 378–82 (2013); Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: 
The Presumption of Liberty 92–93 (Princeton 2004). 
 236 See, for example, Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 
Stan L Rev 443, 465–507 (2018) (using an originalist method to analyze the meaning of a 
constitutional phrase). See also generally Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the 
Uses of History, 82 Fordham L Rev 641 (2013) (analyzing the various uses of history in 
originalist argumentation). 
 237 For an account of the relationship between textualism and originalism, see gener-
ally, for example, Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loyola L Rev 
611 (1999). 
 238 For a defense of original intent, see generally Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Orig-
inal Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw U L 
Rev 226 (1988). For a discussion of the eclipse of original intent by original public meaning 
originalism, see generally Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Con-
temporary Originalist Theory (2011), online at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1825543 (visited 
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abstention, the early history doesn’t really help provide an 
originalist pedigree to federalism-based arguments. There is ex-
isting scholarship that shows early exercises of discretion by the 
courts,239 but not based on federalism. There are reasons to think 
that courts in equity cases could abstain from issuing a decision. 
But this does not rely on federalism considerations at all.240 
The history of Frankfurter’s federalism-derived abstention 
doctrine doesn’t help an originalist connect it to the constitutional 
text. It also doesn’t help in terms of tying it to deep historical 
practice. Rather, it does the exact opposite. The history presented 
in Parts I–III of this Article emphasizes the novelty of Frankfur-
ter’s invention. For originalists who believe that legitimate con-
stitutional interpretation requires ascertaining the meaning of 
the Constitution at the time of its adoption, Frankfurter’s origi-
nality is a liability. 
Originalists could respond to this critique by ending absten-
tion in actions at law, where federalism considerations would nec-
essarily have to operate outside the framework of equity. 
Originalists can accept equity-based abstention as firmly rooted 
 
July 15, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). For an argument that original public meaning 
and original intent might be compatible, see generally John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rap-
paport, Unifying Original Intent and Original Public Meaning, 113 Nw U L Rev 1371 (2019). 
 239 See generally Shapiro, 60 NYU L Rev (cited in note 9) (documenting an expansive 
equity tradition of jurisdiction). See also, for example, New Orleans Public Service, Inc v 
Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 US 350, 359 (1989) (noting  that “federal courts’ 
discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief [is] a discretion that was 
part of the common-law background against which the statutes conferring jurisdiction 
were enacted”). 
 240 Professor David Shapiro’s influential study defending the federal courts’ use of dis-
cretion in exercising jurisdiction invokes both equitable doctrines and common law doctrines 
to defend abstention. See Shapiro, 60 NYU L Rev at 545–74 (cited in note 9). For an expla-
nation of the influence of his article, see generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Dis-
cretion Revisited, 79 Notre Dame L Rev 1891 (2004). But the common law exercises of dis-
cretion come in just two varieties, neither of which is especially helpful for federalism-based 
abstention. First, there were prerogative writs, like certiorari and mandamus, which the 
common law courts could, but did not have to, grant. See Shapiro, 60 NYU L Rev at 572 
(cited in note 9). Second, there were forum non conveniens cases in which common law 
courts declined to hear a case when there was another more convenient venue for proceed-
ing. See id at 573. (For example, historically in the United Kingdom, English courts de-
ferred to Scottish proceedings or vice versa.) But the prerogative writs live on and don’t 
really help to justify the creation of a new form of abstention. And forum non conveniens 
is arguably also unhelpful because it does not grapple with the Supremacy Clause issue; 
the relations between Scottish and English courts lacked any principle that one had su-
premacy over the other. For the history of the Act of Union that provided for Parliamen-
tary sovereignty over the Scottish courts, see James E. Pfander and Daniel D. Birk, Arti-
cle III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 Harv L Rev 1613, 1677 (2011). But this is quite 
different from a general principle of federal law supremacy over state law that exists under 
the Supremacy Clause in the United States. See US Const Art VI, cl 2. 
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in the common law and equity tradition in which the federal 
courts were created. Within the equity framework, a court could 
even take into account federalism and comity. The equity maxim 
is that “equity follows the law”;241 federalism is part of the law in 
the general sense that the Constitution creates a system of lim-
ited (enumerated) powers on the part of the federal government 
and retained (unspecified) powers by the states. Federalism prin-
ciples could be weighed when considering whether to grant an in-
junction. But federalism does not provide a sound, text-based rea-
son for abstaining from actions at law. 
This originalist future for abstention would formalize the 
cautious, modest approach to abstention that the Supreme Court 
has already seemed to favor. In Quackenbush v Allstate Insurance 
Co, 242 the Court declined to apply Burford abstention to an action 
at law.243 The assumption seems to have been that abstention was 
limited solely to the context of equity. The Court was not clear as 
to whether this applies across the board to all forms of abstention, 
and it has never definitely ruled out the possibility of staying fed-
eral actions at law on an abstention theory.244 The originalist ap-
proach sketched in this Section would generalize the idea in 
Quackenbush and rule out the possibility of abstaining in actions 
at law. 
B. The Judicial-Role Concern 
There is a long tradition of legal scholarship that emphasizes 
the importance of the judiciary protecting individual rights. This 
tradition has sometimes been labeled “legal liberalism.” The term 
is imprecise but will do as a placeholder for present purposes. Le-
gal liberals believe that it is an important responsibility of the 
judiciary to enforce individual rights and to protect the “discrete 
and insular minorities”245 who might be vulnerable to the 
 
 241 See, for example, Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 64 at 
53–54 (Little, Brown 12th ed 1877) (noting that the maxim was true in two senses: first, 
“that equity adopts and follows the rules of law in all cases, to which those rules may . . . 
be applicable” and second, “that equity, in dealing with cases of an equitable nature, 
adopts and follows the analogies furnished by the rules of law”). 
 242 517 US 706 (1996). 
 243 Id at 728–31. 
 244 See, for example, Fallon, Hart and Wechsler at 1108 (cited in note 13). 
 245 United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 153 n 4 (1938). 
1786 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1737 
 
vicissitudes of the political process.246 There are a number of the-
oretical paths that one could take to arrive at this position. Pro-
fessor John Hart Ely’s theory of the courts as protecting individ-
ual rights in a countermajoritarian manner might be the most 
influential theoretical statement of legal liberalism.247 The War-
ren Court’s rights-protective jurisprudence is the classic example 
of legal liberalism in practice. Legal liberals prefer to have an en-
gaged judiciary, confident and assertive when it comes to individ-
ual rights.248 
The history of abstention presented in this Article should be 
troubling to legal liberals in a quite different sense than it trou-
bles originalists. While the originalists might object to the method 
by which the Court arrived at abstention doctrine, the liberals 
might be more troubled by the substantive uses of abstention, 
specifically when abstention is employed to allow federal courts 
to avoid deciding cases involving federal rights protections. 
1. Pullman as a cautionary tale. 
Pullman is a classic example of the anti-liberal potential of 
abstention. In Pullman, Frankfurter wrote for a majority that de-
clined to issue a constitutional ruling on the Equal Protection 
Clause. The Texas Railroad Commission had issued an order that 
all sleeping cars operating in Texas had to be in the charge of a 
Pullman conductor, who was white, as opposed to a Pullman por-
ter, who was black.249 Prior to the order, trains with only one 
sleeping car were in the charge of the porter.250 The order was 
transparently motivated by race and the trial proceedings in-
cluded “extensive testimony by white women relating their fear 
of being alone in a Pullman coach with a black porter without a 
white conductor.”251 The order was challenged as a violation of the 
 
 246 In creating this broad-brush-stroke description of legal liberalism, I am indebted 
above all to the insightful treatment provided by Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal 
Liberalism (cited in note 183). 
 247 See generally Ely, Democracy and Distrust (cited in note 225). 
 248 See Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism at 42–59 (cited in note 183). 
 249 Pullman, 312 US at 497–98. 
 250 Id at 497. 
 251 Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond Plessy: Space, Status, and Race in the Era of Jim Crow, 
2000 Utah L Rev 267, 290 n 87. See also Judith Resnik, Rereading “The Federal Courts”: 
Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 
47 Vand L Rev 1021, 1039 (1994) (noting that “[r]ace, class, and gender, and the effects 
thereof, are discretely downplayed” in the usual treatment of the Pullman case by federal 
courts scholars). 
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Equal Protection Clause and as a statutorily defective use of 
power by the Railroad Commission.252 
Frankfurter’s opinion for the Supreme Court acknowledged 
at the outset that the case raised “a substantial constitutional is-
sue.”253 Frankfurter went on to say that the issue was “more than 
substantial. It touche[d] a sensitive area of social policy upon 
which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative 
to its adjudication is open.”254 The theory was that the Texas court 
might be able to construe the state statute in such a way as to 
eliminate the constitutional problem. Maybe. But the result was 
of course to put off deciding the equal protection issue for several 
years. The most generous reading of the opinion is that it consti-
tuted a clever strategic move by Frankfurter: maybe it was a way 
to provide that the Court wouldn’t fracture over the substantive 
constitutional question, a way to ensure that the Court wouldn’t 
take a case until it was ready to decide the matter in a progressive 
manner, or a way to let public opinion catch up. More troublingly, 
it may be read simply as a decision to insulate the Supreme Court 
from a public controversy and to preserve institutional capital on 
the “sensitive” issue of racial discrimination. 
Legal liberals should certainly be troubled by the final possibil-
ity. For the legal liberal, a countermajoritarian, rights-protective 
decision is precisely the kind of decision that courts ought to be 
making when given the opportunity. There might be reasons to 
delay making such a decision, but they have to be good ones to 
overcome the default setting in favor of judicial engagement. And 
federalism-based reasons for delay ought not to be very persua-
sive to legal liberals. 
2. Reasons legal liberals might be willing to delay the 
judicial protection of rights (and why federalism is not a 
good reason). 
Legal liberals might acknowledge that there could be reasons 
for a court to delay or decline to decide an issue of rights. For in-
stance, there has been a years-long debate about the extent to 
which courts can bring about social change and to what extent 
 
 252 Pullman, 312 US at 498. See also Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional 
Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U Pa L Rev 1071, 1077 (1974). 
 253 Pullman, 312 US at 498. 
 254 Id. 
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they are bound by existing social mores.255 Depending on their 
view of that debate, a legal liberal might be sympathetic to a 
strategy that tries to ensure that the Supreme Court doesn’t de-
cide a case until it is likely to do more good than ill.256 One might 
see this as a significant countervailing consideration against the 
default setting of enforcing federal law. 
But federalism as an end in itself will often be a dubious rea-
son for not taking jurisdiction to enforce a facially applicable fed-
eral law.257 To the contrary, federalism considerations—such as 
allowing states to set their own policies and chart their own 
courses—are especially worrisome reasons for denying enforce-
ment of a federal law that protects individual rights.258 One of the 
main purposes of federal protection of individual rights is, on this 
account, to work in a countermajoritarian manner. It is to protect 
the discrete and insular minorities that are not able to protect 
themselves through political processes. If these conditions apply, 
one might think that the Supremacy Clause ought to apply to pre-
vent infringement on those rights. It is precisely in the rights-
based cases where federalism is an issue that one might think the 
 
 255 See generally, for example, Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts 
Bring About Social Change? (Chicago 2d ed 2008) (arguing that courts are not effective at 
facilitating social change); Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Su-
preme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford 2004) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court did not effect a significant change in civil rights but instead was only successful 
where it rode the wave of existing popular opinion, and sometimes was counterproductive 
in prompting a backlash). See also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and 
the Long History of the Civil Rights Movement 433–34 (Oxford 2011) (arguing that courts 
were a necessary, though not sufficient, part of effecting social change in the civil rights era). 
 256 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 NYU L Rev 1185, 
1200–05 (1992) (discussing the court’s remand of a women’s rights case to the legislature 
where it could create laws that would “catch up with a changed world”) (quotation marks 
omitted), quoting Wendy W. Williams, Sex Discrimination: Closing the Law's Gender Gap, 
in The Burger Years: Rights and Wrongs in the Supreme Court 1969–1986 at 123 (Herman 
Schwartz ed 1987). 
 257 See Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State 
Power, 100 Harv L Rev 1485, 1489 (1987) (“Federal jurisdiction is needed to correct stag-
nant situations in which the states are not providing a forum or remedy for would-be fed-
eral plaintiffs.”). 
 258 For one version of this argument, suggesting that confusion about abstention could 
lead to the displacement of “cases that should receive federal court adjudication,” see Julie 
A. Davies, Pullman and Burford Abstention: Clarifying the Roles of State and Federal 
Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 UC Davis L Rev 1, 22 (1986). See also Trainor v Her-
nandez, 431 US 434, 455 (1977) (Brennan dissenting) (“[I]t seems to me that this solici-
tousness for the State’s use of an unconstitutional ancillary proceeding to a civil lawsuit 
is hardly compelled by the great principles of federalism, comity, and mutual respect be-
tween federal and state courts that account for Younger and its progeny.”). 
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federal courts should be most assertive and protective of individ-
ual rights. 
One might respond that state courts are able to apply federal 
law too. Much of the federal courts literature posits that state and 
federal courts must be assumed to be equals. This is sometimes 
called the “parity” assumption.259 But many scholars have 
doubted that this formal assumption actually reflects reality. The 
historical preference of individuals asserting federal rights claims 
for federal courts should be enough to make one doubt the exist-
ence of parity, one scholar wrote decades ago.260 Parity, he con-
cluded, was a myth.261 
There is some anecdotal evidence that judges are willing to 
reach for abstention more aggressively in certain types of cases. 
A study by Professor Theodore Eisenberg reported that judges in 
Los Angeles seemed to be “straining to abstain” when cases in-
volved challenges to statutes, ordinances, or other official poli-
cies.262 The sample of just two years’ worth of cases was too small 
for the study to draw any firm conclusions, but of the eleven cases 
in which the issue was seriously litigated, “one was settled” and 
“three others offered virtually no ground for Pullman or Younger 
abstention.”263 Of the remaining seven cases, abstention was 
 
 259 For defenses of parity, see generally Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker, 
Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial 
Parity, 10 Hastings Const L Q 213 (1983); Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal 
Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm & Mary L Rev 605 (1981). For a critique of the parity 
principle, see generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv L Rev 1105 (1977). 
See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judici-
ary, 36 UCLA L Rev 233, 237 (1988) (arguing that federal courts “provide an alternative 
forum for the vindication of constitutional rights,” not that federal courts are “better than 
state courts”). A useful, though dated, survey of the debate is Michael Wells, Behind the 
Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 
BU L Rev 609 (1991). One article presented as a rebuttal to Professor Burt Neuborne’s 
critique of parity actually reinforces the point that federal and state courts are different: 
it argues not that federal and state courts reach the same results, but rather that 
Neuborne was wrong to assume that federal courts were inherently superior to state 
courts in enforcing individual rights. See generally William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of 
Superiority, 16 Const Commen 599 (1999). See also Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions at 208 
(cited in note 17). Another line of federal courts scholarship uses the term “parity” differ-
ently, to refer to the equality of all federal judges under Article III. See Akhil Reed Amar, 
Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U Chi L Rev 
443, 472 (1989); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two 
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 BU L Rev 205, 221 (1985). 
 260 Neuborne, 90 Harv L Rev at 1109–10 (cited in note 259). 
 261 Id at 1105. 
 262 Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical 
Study, 67 Cornell L Rev 482, 539–40 (1982). 
 263 Id at 540. 
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ordered in six. “In none of the cases was abstention clearly man-
dated and in some it seemed erroneous,” Eisenberg reported.264 
Parity between federal and state courts may very well be mythical 
in practice. 
The history presented in Part III sharpens the point. Legal 
liberals have been right to worry that abstention would get in the 
way of protecting federal rights. The story of Frankfurter and the 
Progressive politics in the background of abstention doctrine 
show that the failure to protect federal rights was not just an in-
cidental byproduct of protecting federalism. Protecting federalism 
was, for some Progressives, a way of intentionally reducing the 
scope of federal rights-protection. It is not too much of a stretch 
to say that the federalism rationale that Frankfurter created was 
not built in reliance on a mythical parity. Instead, he advanced 
the federalism rationale precisely because he believed that parity 
was a myth. For a Progressive like Frankfurter, the political mo-
tivation underlying abstention doctrine seems very likely to have 
been to avoid constitutional rulings by federal courts. To a legal 
liberal, this should be troubling: if the federal judiciary’s raison 
d’être is protecting federal rights, then abstention seems often 
misguided, if not perverse. 
C. Restraining the Courts 
Strands of thought in both progressivism and in conserva-
tism are skeptical of judicial power. There is a long and respected 
history of judicial restraint that transcends crude political cate-
gories. Legal scholars who invoke judicial restraint often use the 
term to reference incremental development of the law by the case 
method.265 That’s part of the idea. But there is a still broader 
sense for the idea of judicial restraint, which is thinking of the 
judiciary as self-restrained out of respect for other, more demo-
cratic branches of government.266 This broader version of judicial 
restraint is a preference for matters of democratic governance to 
 
 264 Id at 541. 
 265 There is a long tradition, associated with Professor James Bradley Thayer, of 
thought about whether courts should be restrained and decide cases in modest and incre-
mental ways. For a survey of this tradition, see generally, for example, Posner, 100 Calif 
L Rev 519 (cited in note 183). For Thayer’s classic articulation, see generally James B. 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv L 
Rev 129 (1893). 
 266 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in 
Judicial Activism?, 73 U Colo L Rev 1401, 1403–04 (2002); Richard A. Posner, The Mean-
ing of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 Ind L J 1, 11–12 (1983). 
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be resolved through democratic politics as often as possible.267 For 
these proponents of restraint, Frankfurter’s vision of federalism-
based abstention may be appealing.268 
Many modern progressives are concerned that federal courts 
as rights-enforcing bodies have considerable potential to advance 
conservative causes. For instance, a growing number of modern 
progressives suggest that modern First Amendment doctrine has 
become a tool to advance conservative and deregulatory objec-
tives.269 Many scholars have suggested that the First Amendment 
has become a modern version of Lochner. 270 
 
 267 For a discussion of the recent history of political uses of “judicial activism” and 
judicial restraint, see generally Jane S. Schacter, Putting the Politics of “Judicial Activ-
ism” in Historical Perspective, 2017 S Ct Rev 209, 221–223. For a historical study of the 
tension between democratic politics and the development of case law in the courts, see 
generally Kunal M. Parker, Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–
1900: Legal Thought Before Modernism (Cambridge 2011). 
 268 I am indebted to Adam Mortara for his suggestions on potential strategic uses of 
abstention doctrine. 
 269 For perhaps the most notable recent iteration of this view, see Janus v American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 138 S Ct 2448, 2487, 2502 (2018) 
(Kagan dissenting), in which Justice Elena Kagan faulted the majority for using First 
Amendment free speech doctrine to impede economic and regulatory policies. The final sen-
tences of her dissent cast the issue in terms of courts against democracy, “black-robed rulers 
overriding citizens’ choices.” Id at 2502. The First Amendment, she argued, was being mis-
applied; it “was meant not to undermine but to protect democratic governance.” Id. 
 270 See generally Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Loch-
nerism, 116 Colum L Rev 1915 (2016); Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 
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proaches to the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L J 375. See also Adam Winkler, We the 
Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights 113–228 (Liveright 2018); 
Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 Wis L Rev 133, 206; Frederick Mark Gedicks 
and Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines: Hobby Lobby’s Puzzling Footnote 
37, in Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, and Zoë Robinson, eds, The Rise of Corporate 
Religious Liberty 323, 332 (Oxford 2016); Robert Post and Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s 
First Amendment, 128 Harv L Rev F 165, 166–67 (2015); Leslie Kendrick, First Amend-
ment Expansionism, 56 Wm & Mary L Rev 1199, 1207 n 40 (2015); Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 Stan L Rev 
1205, 1233 (2014); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New 
Economy, 77 L & Contemp Probs 195, 196–98 (2014); Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The 
Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 Harv L Rev 
30, 109–16 (1993); Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked 
the First Amendment, (New Republic, June 2, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/CMM6 
-UPJY. For a reflection of this sentiment in recent Supreme Court case law, see National 
Institute of Family and Life Advocates v Becerra, 138 S Ct 2361, 2381–82 (2018) (Breyer 
dissenting) (hinting that the majority reached a deregulatory result beyond what was done 
in the Lochner era); Sorrell v IMS Health Inc, 564 US 552, 591–92 (2011) (Breyer dissent-
ing) (criticizing the Court’s conclusion to review a statute under higher First Amendment 
scrutiny and citing Lochner in the process); Citizens United v Federal Election Commis-
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At the other end of the political spectrum, some conservatives 
are similarly wary of aggressive uses of judicial power. They 
share with the progressives old and new a concern about giving 
too much power to unelected, unaccountable courts. A judiciary 
willing to issue sweeping rulings purporting to invalidate demo-
cratically enacted laws is claiming a lot of power and proceeding 
in a nonconservative manner. This line of thought was deeply em-
bedded in modern conservative legal thought. Judicial restraint 
was one of the watchwords of the early conservative legal move-
ment. It goes back at least to the critics of the Warren Court’s 
legal liberalism: they argued that among its faults was contempt 
for the democratic process and willingness to legislate from the 
bench.271 The popularity of judicial restraint has waned in the 
conservative legal movement in recent years.272 (More are now 
comfortable with an assertive judiciary when it is enforcing the 
original meaning of the Constitution.) But there are still con-
servatives who think that the judicial power is one to constrain 
and that judicial restraint is a key component.273 And the charge 
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of judicial activism (often including a reference to Lochner) is still 
a standard in the conservative rhetorical arsenal.274 
Advocates of this kind of judicial restraint might favor adju-
dication by state courts for basically the same reasons that Frank-
furter did. First, to the extent that the emphasis is back on eco-
nomic inequality, concerns about big business having excessive 
power in American politics, and other issues having to do with 
political economy, the state courts might again be thought to be 
the more sympathetic venue. Elected judges might be more likely 
to take populist positions, for instance.275 
Second, to the extent that the federal constitutional law re-
gime is viewed as excessively strict on at least some metrics or in 
some areas, the state courts are more likely to be lax in their ap-
plication. In Frankfurter’s era, it was common for Progressives to 
see the federal courts as more rigidly protective of federal rights 
and state courts as less so. The same assumption holds true to-
day. The more state courts are able to adjudicate these issues, the 
less one might expect that rigid federal constitutional rules will 
be applied in such a way so as to impede the state enforcement 
scheme. Modern progressives share with their ideological fore-
bears a concern about the use of the federal courts as counterma-
joritarian and anti-regulatory institutions. Conservative propo-
nents of restraint are also critical of courts expansively enforcing 
rights claims at the expense of democratic regulations. The basic 
conceptual move is the same, even though the kinds of regulations 
that each side wants to safeguard might be different.276 To the 
extent that progressives and conservatives alike assume that 
state courts are generally more likely to be sympathetic to regu-
lation and less likely to support strict doctrinal enforcement of 
constitutional doctrines, abstention on federalism grounds should 
be popular. A more robust federalism vision of abstention allows 
more space for states to adopt their own distinctive approaches to 
regulation. Pullman, Burford, and Thibadoux all can rest on this 
principle. Younger too fits this pattern in the specific context of 
criminal law. In other words, modern progressives should be 
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interested in abstention for the same reasons that legal liberals 
distrust abstention. 
A few objections to the use of abstention for strategic, political 
reasons are worth considering briefly. First, it might seem like 
abstention can’t make a meaningful policy difference for the kinds 
of issues proponents of restraint would care about because it has 
cast the federal court as both the “bad guy” and the “good guy” at 
the same time. The federal court is the bad guy in the sense that it 
is the entity that is in need of restraining. And the federal court (or 
at least the federal judge) must also play the role of the good guy, 
the one exercising self-restraint to abstain from hearing the case. 
Surely, the skeptic would say, this can’t be realistic. The solution 
to this apparent conundrum is that federal courts as a whole 
might be hostile to some policy that one cares about (they could 
be anti-regulatory, for instance) and yet a particular judge may 
be sympathetic to regulation. A pro-regulatory judge in the dis-
trict court could use abstention to keep some issues out of an anti-
regulatory court of appeals. 
Of course, the appellate court might reverse and get the issue 
back into federal court. But it won’t always be able to do this. 
Here, the standard of review matters: a federal court reviewing 
an abstention decision de novo could easily reclaim a case for the 
federal courts if the district judge had abstained in a close case. 
But a court that reviews abstention decisions only for abuse of 
discretion would have to defer to the district court’s decision to 
abstain in the close case. The courts of appeals are split on this 
issue.277 Some review the issue de novo, providing little space for 
a federal district court to try to manipulate outcomes about which 
it disagrees with the court of appeals by applying abstention ag-
gressively.278 But the potential for manipulation is greater where 
the standard of review is abuse of discretion, as it is in several 
circuits.279 
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Second, one could think (as Professor Martin H. Redish ar-
gues) that abstention doctrines are themselves violations of the 
principle of judicial restraint.280 Federal jurisdiction is created by 
statutes passed by the democratically accountable legislature.281 
So when a federal court declines to exercise this jurisdiction on 
an abstention rationale, it is actually contravening the will of the 
legislature.282 Well-taken though this argument may be, a de-
fender of abstention might still differentiate the kinds of judicial 
restraint principles involved. An automatic obedience to the juris-
dictional statutes might be restraint. But if one has any skepti-
cism that the jurisdictional statutes are perfectly clear,283 then 
there’s likely going to be room for second-order judicial restraint 
principles like abstention. A refusal to take the first stab at an 
unresolved issue of state law could still be an exercise of restraint. 
Third, virtually no one (progressive or conservative) is uni-
formly hostile to assertive rights protection in federal courts. 
Modern progressives, for instance, have offered critiques of free 
speech doctrine and of free exercise doctrine. But to the extent 
that they support assertive federal court enforcement in other ar-
eas (for example, race, gender, or sexual orientation discrimina-
tion), they are not likely to offer unqualified support for absten-
tion. If one was to use abstention for maximal political advantage, 
one would have to decide when and how to apply abstention stra-
tegically for some issues and not for others. (This, of course, raises 
concerns of a different sort—for arguably, the point of neutral 
principles of law is that they don’t perfectly advance a political 
agenda.284) If Pullman and other forms of abstention are 
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mandatory, it will be harder to tailor this; if discretionary, it could 
potentially be better to use as a tool on some varieties of federal 
claims and not others. These are unsettle^d questions.285 For the 
moment, the main point is that Frankfurter’s politically motivated 
federalism theory of abstention might still have a constituency. 
CONCLUSION 
It is sometimes easy to imagine that a familiar concept like 
federalism was always a part of American constitutional jurispru-
dence. A closer examination reveals that this is not the case. 
State-federal relations may have been a familiar part of American 
jurisprudence, but the issue wasn’t labeled “federalism” in Su-
preme Court jurisprudence until Justice Felix Frankfurter did so. 
The introduction of this concept was not happenstance. Frankfur-
ter’s vision of federalism, and of the federal courts’ proper role in 
it, was informed by his political commitments and his observa-
tions of years of political maneuvering around the federal courts. 
It was because of his observations in the Progressive Era that 
Frankfurter believed that federal courts had to be restrained pre-
cisely in order to facilitate the development of a robust adminis-
trative state. Abstention from interfering with state courts was 
one way that federal courts could internalize this lesson. And un-
like some other aspects of Frankfurter’s judicial philosophy, his 
interest in judicial federalism successfully made the transition 
from the Progressive Era to the era of legal liberalism. 
This history gives present-day scholars of federalism several 
possible takeaways. First, at the broadest level of generality, it is 
a reminder that federalism is flexible and susceptible to use for 
various political ends. The history of federalism doesn’t point in a 
single political direction.286 But more troublingly perhaps, it 
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reminds us that federalism is easily manipulated.287 As this his-
tory reveals, federalism was useful precisely because it was so ca-
pacious, so malleable, and so easily employed in a manner unteth-
ered from the original meaning or text of the Constitution (at 
least as to the causes that Frankfurter sought to advance through 
federalism rhetoric). Second, and following from the first point, 
the flexibility and malleability of federalism as a conceptual tool 
should make legal thinkers concerned with text and original 
meaning a bit more skeptical about invocations of federalism 
without a good textual hook. More specifically, the federalism ra-
tionale for abstention should be suspect to an originalist precisely 
to the extent that Frankfurter really was original—to the extent, 
in other words, that the federalism rationale was disconnected 
from constitutional text. Third, even assuming that federalism is 
a good background principle, there are reasons for the legal lib-
eral to be suspicious of its invocation in the abstention context. 
This study of abstention has revealed that federalism’s his-
tory is complex and deeply political. What one makes of this his-
tory depends very much on one’s methodological priors about con-
stitutional interpretation as well as theoretical and policy 
commitments about the substantive values that ought to be ad-
vanced by constitutional law. Depending on those priors, this his-
tory can provide support for the elimination of federalism as a 
distinct rationale for abstention. Or it might motivate others to 
think more carefully about how to maximally use abstention doc-
trine to advance particular political or ideological agendas. His-
tory does not tell us which of these options to take. But for anyone 
who cares about the Constitution, federalism, and the federal 
courts, the history helps us to see how the abstractions of feder-
alism doctrine have been used in the real-world context of con-
tested politics and ideology. 
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